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J. INTRODUCTION 
SINCE the appearance of Professor Davis' book, Discretionary Jus-tice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 a number of significant studies have 
considered the problem of abuse of administrative discretion in the 
• Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A 1963; J.D. 1966, Valparaiso 
University. 
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the reqµirements for the degree 
of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University. The 
author wishes to express his thanks to Professors Abraham D. Sofaer and Peter L. 
Strauss of the Columbia University School of Law for their time and advice in the 
preparation of this article.-Ed. 
1. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMIN,ARY INQUIRY (1969). 
709 
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area of law enforcement. 2 One aspect of administrative discretion 
that warrants closer scrutiny is the power of an agency to impose 
sanctions upon a regulated person found to have violated relevant 
standards of conduct. The importance of this power should not be 
underestimated. When carrying out the sanctioning function, agen-
cies are acting not unlike criminal courts; accordingly, the sanctioning 
process is replete with many of the problems of criminal sentencing, 
including the difficult issue of treating similarly situated offenders 
similarly.3 Solutions to these problems will not develop by discussing 
them in the abstract. Only after the particular processes are studied 
to determine how sanctions are actually selected and imposed, and an 
underlying body of data describing the sanctioning process is accu-
mulated, will it be possible to consider realistic solutions to actual, as 
opposed to suspected, sanctioning deficiencies. 
The purpose here is to discuss the possibilities for administrative, 
legislative, and judicial control of sanctioning discretion. Underlying 
the discussion is the basic premise that, although discretion to select 
sanctions may lead to arbitrary decisions, an alternative system that 
entirely eliminated discretion would result in the mere illusion of 
justice to the extent that mechanical rules deprived the agency of the 
flexibility to assess the various relevant factors that determine the 
appropriateness of a sanction in a particular case.4 A system that 
2. See, e.g., Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the 
Informal Agency Process, 1 J. l..EGAL Snmms 349 (1972). The Administrative 
Conference of the United States has produced several studies on the exercise of 
discretion in the administrative agencies. See generally 1, 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
REPORTS OF THE .ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCB OF THE UNITED STATES (1968-1972) 
[hereinafter REcoMMBNDATIONS AND REPORTS]. 
3. See, e.g., Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. RBv. 1 (1972). 
4. This is not to disparage attempts to limit and control sanctioning discretion by 
the formulation of guidelines that articulate factors to be considered in the selection 
of an appropriate sanction. Indeed, one major purpose of this article is to propose 
such guidelines. Further, social science research techniques may assist in eliminating 
the need for discretion in the sanctioning process. For example, the United 
States Board of Parole uses, as one part of its decision-making practice, a "salient 
factor score," the purpose of which is to "predict the likelihood that an inmate will 
succeed on parole." Project, Parole Release Deci$ionmaking and the Sentencing 
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 824 (1975). The "salient factor score," however, does not 
purport to predict with certainty whether an individual inmate will succeed or fail on 
parole, but tends to "result in more 'correct' predictions in the aggregate • • •• " Id. 
at 824 n.69. The Board's "Guidelines for Decision-making," while making use of 
prediction techniques, do not eliminate discretion altogether. Id. at 825. Thus, 
although statistical techniques may provide an important aid to improving sanctioning 
practice, it seems likely that, given the state of the art, the exercise of discretion will 
continue to be a necessary component of the process if we are to achieve a reasonable 
degree of individualization. See generally Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: 
Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH, L. RBv. 1362, 
1405-15 (1975). It seems appropriate to formulate a rule that at least directs the 
decision-maker's attention to those relevant determinants of a sanction in any given 
case. 
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simplistically denies any exercise of administrative discretion in the 
sanctioning process in effect denies a more complete definition of 
justice. At the same time, however, a system iliat fails to provide 
adequate guides and controls on the exercise of discretion tolerates 
unwarranted departures from the ideal of a rule of law and not men. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is among those 
federal agencies that possess discretionary power to impose sanctions 
upon regulated persons; for example, the SEC regulates the activities 
of broker-dealers registered with the Commission. 5 My study of the 
SEC's practice in this area has been described in an earlier article. 6 In 
general, that study concluded that certain factors describing the of-
fense and offender tended .to correlate with the severity of the sanc-
tion imposed; in particular, the study revealed a pronounced disparity 
in sanctions imposed on respondents affiliated with the New York 
Stock Exchange {NYSE) as opposed to all others. Furthermore, the 
study found that some factors that tended to correlate with sanction 
severity appeared to be used inconsistently. 7 
, This Article will consider some of the possibilities for controlling 
and guiding the SEC's discretion to impose sanctions upon broker-
dealers. Although it is limited to an examination of the Commis-
sion's practice and a discussion of possibilities for reform, the analysis 
contains obvious implications for any agency with the power to 
impose sanctions.8 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF BROKER-DEALER SANCTIONS 
A. Statutory Scheme 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires virtually all bro-
ker-dealers to register with the SEC prior to engaging in the business 
of buying and selling securities for customers. 9 The Commission is 
empowered to impose sanctions upon both registered firms and per-
sons associated with those firms. In the case of a registered firm, the 
Commission has the authority to censure it, place limitations on its 
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4) (Supp. 
Aug. 1975). 
6. Thomforde, Patterns of Disparity in SEC Administrative Sanctioning Practice, 
42 TENN. L. REv. 465 (1975) [hereinafter SEC Case Study]. 
1. See text at notes 19-29 infra. 
8. One example is a parole board, especially if such a board has power to 
determine the duration of the indeterminate sentence. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 
29-30. 
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(a) (Supp. Aug. 
1975). Although three narrow exemptions from registration are available, the nature 
of those exemptions is such that practically all broker-dealers are registered. See B. 
WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 10 (1965). 
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activities, suspend it for a period not to exceed twelve months, or 
revoke its registration.10 In the case of an individual, the Commis-
sion can censure, place limitations on, suspend, or bar a person from 
being associated with a broker-dealer.11 In addition, the Commis-
sion can suspend or expel a broker-dealer firm from membership in 
any self-regulatory body registered with the Commission12 and sus-
pend or bar a person from being associated with any such member.13 
Prior to imposing any or all of the above sanctions, the Commis-
sion must find both that the respondent has violated certain enumer-
ated standards of conduct and that the imposition of the sanction is in 
the public interest.14 In particular, before imposing a sanction, the 
Commission is required to make at least one of the following find-
ings: (1) that the respondent willfully made a materially false or 
misleading statement or omission in any report required to be filed 
· with the Commission, including respondent's application for registra-
tion; (2) that the respondent has been convicted of a felony or 
misdemeanor involving transactions in securities or like offenses; 
(3) that ,the respondent is subject to an injunction prohibiting him 
from engaging in the securities business or prohibiting unlawful 
activity in connection with the business; (4) that the respondent 
willfully violated any provision of the Exchange Act, the Securities 
Act of 1933, the Investment Company Act of 1940, or the Invest-
ment Advisors Act of 1940, or any rule or regulation promulgated 
under those acts; or (5) that the respondent willfully aided, abetted, 
or procured the violation of the above mentioned acts, or failed 
reasonably to supervise the business with a view to preventing viola-
tions of the securities laws.15 
Once it makes the requisite finding of misconduct, the Commis-
sion can exercise its discretion in imposing a sanction.16 The only 
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1S(b)(4), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4) 
(Supp. Aug. 191S). 
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1S(b)(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(6) 
(Supp. Aug. 1975). 
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(2), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(2) 
(Supp. Aug. 197S). Self-regulatory bodies include associations of brokers and dealers 
registered under section lSA(b), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (Supp. Aug, 197S), clearing 
agencies registered under section 17A(b)(1), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78q-1(b)(1) (Supp. 
Aug. 1975), and securities exchanges registered under section 6(a), 1S U.S.C.A. § 
78f(a) (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(3), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(3) 
(Supp. Aug. 197S). 
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 1S(b)(4), 1S U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4) 
(Supp. Aug. 197S). 
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1S(b)(4)(A)-(B), 1S U.S.C.A. §~ 
78o(b)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. Aug. 197S). 
16. For instance, the Commission may choose to revoke the registration pursuant 
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express statutory limit on the Commission's exercise of discretion is 
the requirement that the Commission find that the sanction is in the 
public interest.17 Although the existence of the public interest stan-
dard implies that there are some limits to the SEC's exercise of 
discretion, the broad range of possible interpretations of this stan-
dard18 creates the potential for inequities in the sanctioning process. 
An analysis of the exercise of discretion by ,the SEC is ultimately an 
analysis of how, in practice, the SEC has defined the public interest. 
B. Summary of the Case Study ·of SEC Sanctioning Practice 
The case study of SEC sanctioning practice analyzed 344 cases 
involving broker-dealers and persons associated with broker-dealers 
who were found by the Commission to have violated the securities 
acts.19 The study attempted to answer three related questions about 
SEC sanctioning practice: first, which factors describing the offense 
and the offender are utilized by the Commission in selecting sanc-
tions; second, does the Commission's over-all use of these factors, or 
combinations of factors, tend to correlate with sanction severity; and, 
third, do the factors, or combinations of factors, appear to be utilized 
in -a consistent manner-that is to say, do like cases -tend to receive 
like sanctions. 20 , 
To answer these questions, each case was first analyzed with 
reference to specific factors describing both the offender and the 
offense involved. Factors describing an individual respondent char-
acterized either his status or his attitude. Factors relating to the re-
spondent's status included age, experience, prior ['ecord, and general 
reputation and current status in the industry; those relating to the 
respondent's attitude included intent, willingness to reform, willing-
ness to make restitution, and willingness to consent to the imposition 
to section 15(b)(4), and expel the respondent from the National Association of 
Securities Dealers pursuant to section 19(h) (2). · 
17. Section 19,(h) has an additional general requirement that action taken by the 
Commission be "for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the 
purposes of'' the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 19(h)(l), (2), (3), 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 78s(h)(l), (2), (3) (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
18. For instance, the SEC has occasionally found that the imposition of a 
sanction for a willful violation is not required to protect the public interest. See, e.g., 
David G. Baird, 43 S.E.C. 815 (1968). . 
19. As used herein, "case" refers to each individual respondent, even though more 
than one respondent may have been a patty to the same action. 
20. As used herein, a "standard" is the criterion or rule; it measures and 
announces the legal significance of a particular factor or combination of factors. A 
. "factor'' is an element or characteristic of the offense or offender that may be referred 
to or embodied in a standard, 
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of a sanction. Factors describing the offense included not only the 
particular statutory section or rule violated, but also the geographic 
scope of the violation and the amount of money and the number of 
investors involved. 
It was possible, therefore, not only to determine which factors 
appeared in the cases, and with what frequency, 21 but also to deter-
mine whether a correlation existed between certain factors and sanc-
tion severity. In general, the study indicated that the presence of 
certain factors tended to affect the severity of the sanction imposed in 
a manner that was both predictable and consistent with stated Com-
mission policy.22 Thus, although 37.8 per cent of all cases resulted 
in expulsion, the expulsion rate increased if the offense involved fraud 
(42.1 per cent) or an intentional violation of the law (53.2 per cent), 
or if the respondent either had a prior record (66.7 per cent) or 
contested the Commission's action (62.1 per cent). On the other 
hand, the expulsion rate dropped in those cases in which the offense 
did not involve fraud (21.1 per cent), or in which the respondent 
offered to make restitution (20 per cent), had a good reputation 
(17.9 per cent), consented to the imposition of a sanction (25.5 per 
cent), or was willing to reform (3.7 per cent).23 
Despite the obvious impact of certain factors, the study revealed 
that no single factor was controlling. The lack of a controlling factor 
is not particularly surprising given the variety of possible combina-
tions in which factors (both mitigating and aggravating) may appear. 
However, even when apparently similar cases were compared, not all 
respondents received the same sanction. Further, the study revealed 
that some factors were not always utilized by the Commission even 
though they were discoverable and their relevance had been acknowl-
edged by the SEC in other cases. For example, although the respon-
dent's reputation in the industry was acknowledged as a relevant 
consideration in over 12 per cent of the cases ( the presence of a good 
reputation correlating with a reduction in expulsion rate), the reputa-
tion of respondents in the other 88 per cent of the cases apparently 
was not considered in selecting an appropriate sanction. 24 It is 
possible of course that the Commission did consider reputation in all 
cases, but simply failed to mention that it had been considered. It is 
21. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 493 (Table R) (summarizing frequency 
with which factors appeared). 
22. For a discussion of SEC sanctioning policy to protect investors, deter viola• 
tions, achieve voluntary compliance, and rehabilitate respondents, see text at notes 46-
78 infra. 
23. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 493 (Table R), 476-97. 
24. See id. at 490-91 (Table P), 493 (Table R). 
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also possible, however, that the factor was overlooked or ignored in 
some cases. 25 Thus, although the study showed that the presence of 
certain factors tended to correlate with sanction severity, it also raised 
the possibility that the factors utilized by the Commission in deter-
mining an appropriate sanction were not applied consistently. 
Finally, the data revealed what appears to be a substantial dispar-
ity between the severity of sanctions imposed upon respondents affili-
ated with the NYSE and sanctions imposed upon all others. Table A 
summarizes the analysis by comparing ·the rates of expulsion for 
NYSE respondents with the rates for all other respondents in fraud 
and nonfraud cases.26 
Fraud 
Rate of Ex-
pulsion 
Nonfraud 
Rate of Ex-
pulsion 
Rate of 
Censure 
TABLE A 
Comparison of Expulsion Rates for NYSE 
Respondents and All Others 
N.Y. Non-N.Y. 
( other than (other than 
NYSE NYSE) NYSE) 
13.5%(10of 74) 24.5%(14 of 57) 64.2%(88 of 137) 
4%( 1 of 25) 28.6%( 4 of 14) 31.3%(10of 32) 
48%(12 of 25) 28.5%( 4 of14) 12.5%( 4 of 32) 
The disparity in sanction severity is most pronounced when the 
rates of expulsion for NYSE and non-New York fraud are com-
pared;27 however, the disparity also exists in the smaller category of 
25. Although reputation was noted in only 12 per cent of the cases, it is obvious 
that all respondents have some kind of reputation. This is not to suggest that 
reputation will always be relevant. It is to say, however, that, when a discoverable 
factor is not specifically considered, one possible conclusion is that it was overlooked 
in some cases in which it might have been relevant. 
26. These findings are discussed in detail in SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 
491-515. 
27. Even the 13.5 per cent figure is misleadingly high. Only one firm, Pickard & 
Co., had its registration revoked; the firm and its employees who were barred account 
for over 40 per cent of all NYSE bars and revocations. See C. Eugene Osment, II, 
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8658 (July 25, 1969); Joseph V. Shields, Jr., SEC 
Exchange Act Release No. 8484 (Jan. 3, 1969), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SF.C. L. REP. ,r 77,643; Jack Flittman, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8449 
(Nov. 4, 1968); John W. Bendall, Jr., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8448 (Nov. 
14, 1968); Pickard & Co., SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8447 (Nov. 14, 1968); 
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nonfraud.28 In general, the study concluded that New Yorkers (partic-
ularly in fraud cases) tend to be less likely to be expelled than non-
New Yorkers, and NYSE respondents, regardless of their location, are 
the least likely of all to be expelled in either fraud or nonfraud cases. 
As described in more detail in the case study, this disparity was not 
explained by taking into account more particular descriptions of the 
offense and offender.29 
The case study of SEC practice thus presents two problems: first, 
the possibility that in exercising its discretion to sanction offenders the 
SEC is utilizing relevant factors in an inconsistent manner; and, 
second, that SEC sanctioning practice has resulted in a disparity 
between the treatment of NYSE and non-NYSE respondents. The 
question, then, is whether these kinds of problems lend themselves to 
correction by administrative, legislative, or judicial action. 
ill. CONTROL OF DISCRETION BY LEGISLATIVE OR 
.ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
A. The Necessity, Desirability, and Practicability of Rules To Limit 
Discretion 
The use of discretion30 in the sanctioning process is as essential as 
the abuse of discretion is intolerable: Because rules cannot be formu-
lated to deal with every combination of factors that may confront a 
decision-maker, some discretion is necessary to make the punishment 
fit the crime; at the same time, unlimited discretion may lead to a 
situation in which sanctions are imposed without standards, without 
certainty, and without an even hand.31 To a great extent, the process 
of administrative sanctioning (and the process of sentencing in gen-
eral) has been allowed to proceed free from rules and standards that 
would define the boundaries of the exercise of discretion. At the 
outset, then, any attempt to formulate a rule purporting to limit 
sanctioning discretion ought to consider three broad questions: Is 
rule-making in this area (1) necessary, (2) desirable, or (3) practic-
able?32 
John Sackville-Pickard, SEC Exchange Act Re]ease No. 8433 (Oct. 24, 1968), [1967-
1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 77,620. 
28. Moreover, in nonfraud cases NYSE respondents had a significantly higher 
frequency of censure. See Table A. 
29. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 501-15. 
30. "Discretion" is used herein as defined by Davis: "A public officer has 
discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice 
among possible courses of action or inaction." K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 4. 
31. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 1-5. 
32. These three questions are implicit in Professor Sofaer's "Framework for 
Governing Discretion," described in Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretion-
ary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 CoLUM, L. Rav. 1293, 1295-98 (1972). 
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It has been suggested that the subject of administrative discretion 
is deserving of judicial attention "only when :the [exercise of 
discretion] may have serious consequences."33 This generalization 
provides an appropriate starting point for questioning the necessity of 
rule-making in the area of sanctioning discretion. It would seem 
obvious that the manner in which the SEC exercises its power to 
choose an appropriate sanction has "serious consequences" for the 
respondent since, among other things, the respondent may lose the 
right to engage in the securities business. 34 
Yet, even if the exercise of Commission discretion may have 
serious consequences, the necessity for rule-making diminishes if the 
discretion is already "effectively governed by standards, rules or other 
guides that narrow discretion."35 Although SEC sanctioning practice 
is limited to some extent by existing standards, these standards only 
minimally restrict the exercise of discretion. For example, the statu-
tory "protection of investors" and "public interest" standards act as 
general guidelines for the exercise of sanctioning discretion. How-
ever, these general guidelines will be of little help to regulated parties 
in determining either what the law is or how it will be applied in a 
particular case. Similarly, the SEC currently relies on certain factors 
that describe the offense and offender in determining an appropriate 
sanction, yet the case study shows that the Commission utilizes those 
factors in an inconsistent manner. Thus, even if appropriate stan-
dards for the exercise of Commission discretion presently exist, rule-
making might contribute to a more effective utilization and applica-
tion of those standards. 
If there is a general necessity to provide more effective guidelines 
for the sanctioning practice, one may still question the desirability of 
attempting to limit discretion by rule-making. In particular, one may 
ask whether rules that purport to provide standards to limit discretion 
deprive administrators of the flexibility necessary to adapt to unantici-
pated circumstances or to achieve individualized justice. 36 On one 
level, of course, the question goes to the matter of draftsmanship. A 
poorly drafted rule might not only deprive the adjudicator of flexibil-
ity, but might also "require" sanctions that would be as unjust as those 
imposed under a system of standardless sanctioning. Beyond the 
problem of adequate draftsmanship, the question focuses on the 
33. Id. at 1296. 
34. Not only expulsion, but suspension as well, may prove economica11y disastrous 
for a sma11 firm. See SEC, REPORT OF nm .ADVISORY CoMMI'ITEE ON ENFORCEMENT 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 45 (1972) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITIEE REPORT]. 
35. Sofaer, supra note 32, at 1296. 
36. Id. at 1296-97. 
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tension between the goals of consistency and flexibility in law en-
forcement. To recognize this tension, however, is not to require a 
choice between goals, for the principles of flexibility and consistency 
are ultimately compatible. 
It has been suggested that consistency is not a primary require-
ment of law enforcement and that, in the particular context of sanc-
tioning, there is no legal necessity that similar cases be treated simi-
larly. 37 If taken literally, however, such a position runs counter to the 
principle of equal justice by the rule of law-a principle that is rooted 
in the Constitution. Moreover, what may appear to be comparable 
cases are often not comparable at all. For example, suppose 
that two broker-dealers each sold securities by means of a misleading 
prospectus. One, an experienced salesman with a prior record, may 
have known that portions of the prospectus were false; the other, an 
inexperienced person, may only have been negligent in not discover-
ing the truth. Accordingly, if experience, state of mind, or prior 
offenses are relevant considerations in qetermining an appropriate 
sanction, the two cases are not "alike." Once genuinely similar cases 
are identified, the principle of consistency becomes far more com-
pelling. 
The principle of flexibility becomes important in the identification 
process. Flexibility is not a license to ignore relevant factors; rather, 
it permits the adjudicator to take into account those factors that 
determine like cases. Thus, a rule that articulates relevant factors to 
guide sanctioning discretion does not necessarily interfere with the 
proper role of flexibility. A rule that is designed to direct the 
attention of the adjudicator to the generally relevant factors and to 
permit the adjudicator to take into account factors peculiar to a 
particular case furthers both the principle of consistency and the 
principle of flexibility. 38 
Another arguably undesirable effect of rules that guide discretion 
is that known standards eliminate the potential deterrent effect of 
uncertainty. Thus, for example, if a prosecutor's office is unable to 
prosecute all known violations, the publication of the standards it 
follows in selecting cases might result in encouraging violations by 
37. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); Martin A. 
Fleishman, 43 S.E.C. 185, 190 (1966). Professor Nonnan Abrams, in an excellent 
treatment of prosecutorial discretion, quotes Emerson's line: "A foolish consistency is 
the hob-goblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and 
divines." Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
19 UCLA L. REv. 1, 5 n.11 (1971). One may, however, note the distinction between 
foolish and necessary consistency. 
38. See generally Reiss, Research on Administrative Discretion and Justice, 23 J. 
LEGAL EDuc. 69, 72-73 (1970). 
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those not subject to prosecution under those standards. Yet, even if 
under some circumstances reasons exist for not publicly disclosing 
factors that guide prosecutorial discretion, 39 the situation is different 
in the area of sanctioning discretion: The value of known standards 
that control the sanctioning process would seem to outweigh the value 
of any possible deterrent effect of uncertainty. After all, a rule that 
articulates standards to limit sanctioning discretion would not neces-
sarily require leniency or encourage violations; rather, the effect of a 
properly drafted rule would be to ensure that reasonably equal sanc-
tions were imposed upon similarly situated offenders. 
Finally, if a rule limiting sanctioning discretion is both necessary 
and desirable, one might still question the practicability of requiring 
such a rule. Would the costs involved in formulating and applying 
such a rule outweigh its benefits?40 Naturally, costs in time and 
manpower are incurred both in promulgating rules and in writing 
decisions applying such rules to a given case. Whether these costs 
are prohibitive, however, depends upon the existing practice of a 
particular agency. The costs of formulating and applying a rule to 
limit the sanctioning discretion of the SEC would be minimal: The 
Commission has the statutory authority to formulate rules in accord-
ance with the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act.41 The costs of administrative rule-making would seem to be 
balanced by the prospective savings to the Commission and regulated 
persons from the existence of articulated guidelines to delimit sanc-
tioning practice. Because of the Commission's expertise in this area, 
SEC rule-making would also appear to be more efficient than appeal-
ing to either the courts or Congress. Perhaps more importantly, the 
Commission already writes opinions purporting to give reasons for 
imposing its sanctions; thus, a rule requiring the Commission to 
demonstrate that it has considered certain relevant factors would 
impose little additional burden upon existing adjudicative procedures. 
A rule aimed at controlling the exercise of discretion in this relatively 
formal sanctioning process would be intended to direct adjudicative 
efforts more profitably for the benefit of both the Commission and 
the regulated party. 
The practicability of requiring a rule to limit sanctioning discre-
tion must ultimately turn upon our ability to draft a rule that will 
offer meaningful guidance to the adjudicator. In an analogous 
39. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 37, at 28-34; Sofaer, supra note 29, at 1297. 
40. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 32, at 1296, 1298. 
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970). The 
rule-making requirements of the APA are found at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). 
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context, Justice Harlan described the possibility of articulating mean-
ingful standards to guide a jury in sentencing as "beyond present 
human ability."42 Whether or not such pessimism is v,arranted, 
however, depends upon what one attempts to achieve in a rule aimed 
at guiding the exercise of human judgment. One could, for example, 
promulgate a rule that declared that any sale of securities by fraud 
-would result in expulsion; such a rule would be easy to apply but 
would offend our felt need for individualized justice. On the other 
hand, one might endeavor to formulate a rule that defined every 
possible combination of factors in terms of a precise equation in an 
attempt to produce absolutely equal sanctions; however, here one 
must agree with Justice Harlan-such an attempt would be "beyond 
present human ability." Yet neither of these extremes is necessary. 
The Commission's own practice demonstrates that it is possible to 
articulate certain relevant factors that ought to affect sanction sever-
ity. The object of formulating a rule to require the Commission to 
utilize these factors more consistently in the sanctioning process 
would be to codify the best of SEC practice in order to bring about a 
more uniform application of existing standards. 
Obviously, doubts about the practicability of formulating a mean-
ingful rule that will accommodate the principles of flexibility and 
consistency43 will not be resolved by mere generalizations. The dis-
cussion, therefore, must focus on the essential elements of a rule and 
culminate in a proposed rule applicable to SEC practice. 
B. The Elements of a Rule 
The only explicit statutory standard that limits the SEC's sanc-
tioning discretion is the requirement that any sanction imposed by the 
Commission be in the public interest. 44 This standard does not 
adequately guard against the abuse of discretion, nor does it effec-
tively guide the exercise of discretion. A workable rule must provide 
both specific guidelines that are consistent with and supportive of the 
purposes of the legislation being enforced, and procedures designed 
to ensure that the substantive statutory provisions are followed. Thus, 
the first step in formulating a rule to guide SEC sanctioning discretion 
is to determine the purposes to be served by imposing a sanction upon 
a regulated party; indeed, our perception of the proper purposes of 
42. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971). See also In re Sierant, 
24 N.Y.2d 675, 682,249 N.E.2d 455, 458, 301 N.Y.S.2d 604, 610 (1969). 
43. Professor Davis refers to this balance as "[t]he optimum breadth for discre-
tionary power." K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis omitted). 
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4) 
(Supp. Aug. 1975). But see note 17 supra. . 
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SEC sanctions will affect the necessity, severity, or validity of impos-
ing a sanction in any given case. 45 Once the proper sanctioning 
purposes are discovered, the relevant factors that any rule serving 
these purposes must articulate can be identified, and the procedural 
requirements of such a rule can be developed. 
1. The Purpose of SEC Sanctions 
The purpose of SEC sanctions has been described as remedial 
rather than punitive; thus, it has been said that sanctions are intended 
to protect investors rather than to punish offenders. 46 We should, 
however, question whether the matter can be disposed of simply by 
attaching the remedial-punitive labels.47 Is this distinction either 
meaningful or desirable? In particular, to what extent, if any, should 
this distinction influence the nature of a rule designed to control 
sanctioning discretion? 
The Commission and the courts purport to be guided by the 
remedial-punitive distinction, as a recent Sixth Circuit case demon-
strates. In Beck v. SEC,48 the petitioner, a securities salesman, had 
been suspended by the Commission for four months for willfully 
violating the Securities Act by selling securities through the use of 
false and misleading statements. 49 Recognizing the remedial-puni-
tive distinction, the Commission stated: "The sanctions authorized by 
Section 15 of the Exchange Act are part of a comprehensive regula-
tory scheme -to protect the public interest . . . . We have been cogni-
zant of the importance of exercising the discretionary power reposed 
in us in this area in a manner that will afford investor protection 
without visiting upon the wrongdoers adverse consequences not re-
quired in achieving statutory objectives."5° Finding "that the proba-
bility of similar future occurrences is such that a temporary exclusion 
from the securities business is required,"51 the Commission con-
45. Judge Frankel suggests that one of the "first principles" in an attempt to 
reform sentencing practice should be "a statement of the substantive aims of sen-
tencing ..•• " Frankel, supra note 3, at 41. His second recommended principle is 
"some fundamental procedural directives ••.• " Id. See text at notes 99-101 infra. 
46. See E. WEISS, supra note 9, at 203. 
47. There are, to be sure, other possible sanction purposes, including rehabilita-
tion, voluntary compliance, and deterrence. 'See text at notes 72-78 infra. 
48. 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970). The case had been before the court once 
before. 413 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1969). At that time, the Sixth Circuit remandec;l the 
case to the Commission for a more specific statement of the reasons for suspending 
Beck, adding thai, without an adequate statement of reasons, it could not "determine 
whether this sanction constitutes an abuse of discretion .•.. " 413 F.2d at 834. 
49 •. Commonwealth Sec. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 100, at 100 (1969). 
50. 44 S.E.C. at 101 (footnote omitted). 
51. 44 S.E.C. at 102. 
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eluded that the sanction "was necessary and appropriate for the re-
medial purposes contemplated under the federal securities laws.''112 
In an attempt to convince the Commission that the sanction was un-
necessary, Beck pointed out that the 1961 violation occurred when he 
was inexperienced and inadequately trained. Subsequently, Beck 
continued, he had "received appropriate training from a securities 
firm which [had] employed him since August 1962," and, since that 
time and July 1968 when the Commission suspended him, "there 
[had] been no complaints concerning his conduct .... "53 The 
Commission, while agreeing that these factors were "favorable" and 
noting that they were considered in imposing suspension, held that 
"they do not assure -that Beck will observe ithe required standard of 
conduct in the future . . . ."54 Accordingly, the SEC found that a 
four month suspension was necessary "to adequately ,[impress] upon 
[Beck] . . . ·the necessity of avoiding a repetition of his specific mis-
conduct. . . ."55 The court of appeals, however, disagreed. Noting 
that "-the record discloses no reason to believe that [Beck] is inclined 
to commit any further illegal or fraudulent acts,"116 the court con-
cluded "that the Commission's order is punitive, not remedial" and 
that "the relationship between the remedy adopted and the stated 
reasons . . . is so tenuous .that we deem the order a gross abuse 
of the Commission's remedial authority."57 
Beck is important not only because it demonstrates commitment 
to the principle that SEC sanctions should have a remedial purpose, 
but also because it demonstrates that the characterization of a particu-
lar sanction as "punitive" rather than "remedial" may have an impor-
tant effect on the validity of the Commission's action. 58 Is one to 
conclude, therefore, that whenever a sanction can be characterized as 
punitive, its imposition is an abuse of discretion? It is arguable that 
the sanctions available to the SEC--censure, suspension, and expul-
sion-always have a punitive effect, particularly from the point of 
view of the offender. Beck itself demonstrates how vague the distinc-
52. 44 S.E.C. at 103. 
53. 44 S.E.C. at 100-01. 
54. 44 S.E.C. at 102. 
55. 44 S.E.C. at 102-03. 
56. 430 F.2d at 674. 
57. 430 F.2d at 675. The court also noted that the six-year delay in imposing tho 
sanction was not Beck's fault. 430 F.2d at 674. Other persons involved in the same 
scheme were criminally prosecuted during this time. See United States v. Armel, 384 
F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968). 
58. The case is also significant in that it represents a rare reversal of an SEC 
sanction. See text at notes 169-71 infra. The courts have usually maintained a 
hands-off attitude when reviewing SEC sanctions. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 
F.2d 107, 110 (1967); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8-9 (1965). 
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tion between punitive and remedial sanctions can be. For example, 
although the court in Beck held that SEC sanctions may not be 
punitive, it agreed that sanctions may be used to deter the offender 
from future offenses. 59 Yet, for what reason is an offender deterred, 
if not to avoid future punishment? To say that an offender will be 
deterred not to avoid punishment, but rather to avoid future remedial 
action is to create a formal distinction without substance. 60 Thus, if 
punitive effect alone invalidates a sanction, courts should feel hard-
pressed to sustain any SEC sanction. 61 
Apparently, the punitive-remedial labels owe their continuing 
vitality, at least in part, to the belief that empowering a nonjudicial 
instrumentality with the authority to impose criminal (i.e., punitive) 
sanctions may raise constitutional difficulties. 62 To be sure, adminis-
trative procedures are "incompatible with the accepted rules and 
constitutional guarantees of power governing the trial of criminal 
prosecutions."83 The accepted technique used to avoid the constitu-
tional problem has been to label administrative sanctions "remedial" 
in order to be "free of the punitive criminal element."64 Commenta-
tors65 have often noted Justice Frankfurter's apparent frustration with 
the "dialectical subtleties"66 of the distinction. His characterization 
of the majority's use of the punitive-remedial rationale in United 
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess67 is illustrative of the problem: "The 
argument seems to run thus: Double jeopardy means attempting to 
punish criminally twice; this is not an attempt to punish criminally 
because it is a civil proceeding; it is a civil proceeding because . . . 
it is a 'civil sanction' . . . and the sanction is 'civil' because it is 
'remedial' and not 'punitive' in nature."68 Justice Frankfurter went 
on to suggest that "[p]unitive ends may be pursued in civil proceed-
ings, and, conversely, the criminal process is frequently employed to 
attain remedial rather than punitive ends."69 Justice Black's majority 
59. 430 F.2d at 674. 
60. Although the court found it unnecessary to decide whether a sanction may 
have as one of its purposes deterring others from violations, the Commission claimed 
this was a proper remedial purpose. 430 F.2d at 675. 
61. Reviewing courts usually simply declare that SEC sanctions are not punitive, 
but rather remedial. See, e.g., Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940). 
62. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 (1938); K. DAVIS, 1 
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.13 (1958); McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The 
Administrative Process, 49 IowA L REv. 44i, 444-45 (1964). 
63. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,403 (1938). 
64. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). 
65. See, e.g., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.13, at 135 n.12. 
66. United States er rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943) (concurring). 
67. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
68. 317 U.S. at 553 (concurring). 
69. 317 U.S. at 554. 
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opinion in Hess appears at least to have aoknowledged Justice Frank-
furter's objection. Justice Black pointed out that" '{p]unishment, in 
a certain and very limited sense, may be the result of [a remedial 
statute] so far as the wrong-doer is concerned,' but this is not enough 
to label it as a criminal statute."70 
It may be possible to give more substantive content to the reme-
dial-punitive characterization if a distinction is drawn between the 
primary purpose of a sanction and its possible effect; indeed, Justice 
Black may have been alluding to this distinction when he noted in 
Hess that the fact that the enforcement of a statute may result in 
punishment, from the offender's standpoint, is not enough to make it 
a criminal statute. For example, the Beck decision can be interpreted 
as holding that the SEC's sanction was invalid not because of the 
presence of a punitive effect, but because of the absence of a valid 
remedial purpose. Since Beck committed no violation during the six-
year period following his infraction, he did not appear to need 
suspension ".to adequately ,[impress] upon him . . . the necessity of 
avoiding a repetition of his specific misconduct . . . ."71 Thus, the 
absence of factors showing that investors were in need of protection 
from Beck led the court to conclude that there was no remedial 
purpose served by suspension and that the sanction was, therefore, 
primarily punitive. Presumably, if the sanction had been imposed 
shortly after Beck's violation, the SEC might have been warranted in 
at least suspending Beck on the ground that there was a possibility of 
future violations. The primary purpose of a suspension under those 
circumstances would have been to protect investors by deterring Beck 
from future violations, even though suspension clearly would have 
had a punitive effect from Beck's point of view. This is not to 
suggest that the line between purpose and effect is always clear or 
easy to draw. Beck offers some evidence, however, that the distinc-
tion can provide a workable basis of decision for both the Commis-
sion and reviewing courts. 
Finally, there are other remedial purposes that may be served by 
SEC sanctions, in addition to those illustrated by Beck. Although 
rehabilitation has become a significant, if not the primary, goal of the 
criminal sanction, 72 it is probably a far less significant function of the 
regulation of the securities market. By and large, regulatory offend-
ers are not perceived to have social or psychological problems that 
have led to their offenses; furthermore, the Commission simply lacks 
70. 317 U.S. at 551, quoting Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 157 (1899). 
71. Commonwealth Sec. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 100, 102-03 (1969). 
72. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 29. 
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the necessary resources (both in terms of manpower and in terms of 
statutory authority) to undertake the kind of rehabilitation hoped for 
in the criminal sector. On the other hand, a kind of rehabilitation of 
offenders is attempted when the Commission (as part of its sanction) 
conditions re-entry into the securities business on the respondent's 
retraining and close supervision. 73 This appears to be a technique 
that is becoming more favored with the Commission.74 
An SEC sanction may also serve the purpose of achieving volun-
tary compliance with the law.75 The Commission's primary method 
of achieving voluntary compliance is probably through interpretive 
releases and statements of policy that inform regulated persons about 
the law and how it will be enforced. 76 Public notice of the imposi-
tion of a sanction may also contribute to voluntary compliance by 
serving as a deterrent to others. 77 Acknowledging the deterrent value 
of a sanction reintroduces the question of the use of sanctions as a 
form of punishment, for how else does a sanction deter, if not as a 
threat of punishment to those who would do likewise? Again, how-
ever, the question is one of ascertaining the primary purpose of a 
sanction, for here the purpose is not to punish, but to achieve general 
compliance--a valid remedial purpose. 78 
To summarize, it appears that an SEC administrative sanction 
may serve several remedial purposes that are consistent with the 
73. See, e.g., Roy V. Montgomecy, SEC Exchange Act Release No._ 8223 (Jan. 3, 
1968). 
74. This assertion is based on the author's review of all SEC administrative 
decisions between Noveniber 1973 and October 31, 1974. See, e.g., Reynolds & Co., 
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10835 (May 31, 1974), [1973'-1974 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I79,811. 
15. See ADVISORY CoMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 34, at 14. 
76. Releases not only explain Commission interpretations of law and policy, but 
also serve as warnings to the broker-dealer community. In the midst of the 1968 
back-office "crunch," for instance, the Commission issued a release to the industry 
warning its members that certain practices (e.g., accepting a customer's order when 
unable to deliver the securities) would be construed as violations of the anti-fraud 
provisions of the Exchange Act. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8363 (Aug. 7, 
1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ii 77,583. 
77. The Commission, at least, believes in the deterrent value of sanctions. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth Sec. Corp., 44 S.E.C. 100, 101 (1969). 
78. Professor Goldschmid suggests that it would be worthwhile to study the 
deterrent value of administrative sanctions. See Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the 
Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 2, at 896, 
946. 
The general deterrent value of a sanction raises a potential question of fairness to 
a particular offender. If, for example, the facts of a case would not otherwise 
warrant a severe sanction to deter a particular offender, would the Commission be 
justified in making an "example" of him? The Commission could conceivably justify 
any sanction by its deterrent effect on others. General deterrence should be a 
secondacy reason for imposing a sanction; its use as the sole justification is questiona-
ble. 
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purpose of the securities acts to protect investors and ensure fair 
securities markets.79 A rule to guide sanctioning discretion should 
require that the Commission support the imposition of a sanction in 
light of the need to protect investors, deter violations, achieve volun-
tary compliance with the securities laws, or contribute to the rehabili-
tation of offenders. Naturally, the importance of any one purpose, or 
combination of purposes, will depend on the particular case being 
adjudicated. A requirement that purposes be articulated, however, 
will tend to ensure (though it will not guarantee) that the SEC has, in 
fact, selected a sanction appropriate for the individual offender as well 
as one necessary to achieve the regulatory purposes of sanctioning. 
Indeed, the Commission generally supports its sanctions with such 
reasons, so the requirement should impose no new or onerous burden 
on the staff. 80 By articulating the proper purposes served by SEC 
sanctions, the rule would also provide a form of notice to respondents 
that would enable them to offer "evidence" on their behalf relevant to 
those purposes. 81 Further, such reasons, in light of the findings of 
fact, would provide a meaningful basis for judicial review of sanc-
tions. 
2. Factors Describing the Offense and the Offender 
Formal recognition of the purposes served by sanctions provides, 
at best, only a general directive to guide Commission discretion. 
Realization of the dual sanctioning objectives of individualized justice 
and equal treatment of like cases depends upon the Commission's 
ability to describe not only the specific law violated, but also how it 
was violated, and by whom. Thus, over the years, the Commission 
has come to rely upon a series of factors that describe both the offense 
and the offender. The importance of these factors becomes clear 
when considered. in light or the remedial purpose of the Exchange 
Act. 
In determining the nature of an offense, the Commission consid-
ers not only the broad categories of fraud and nonfraud, but also the 
particular types of fraud and nonfraud offenses; obviously, the gen-
eral goal of protecting investors requires that some types of offenses 
19. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (Supp. Aug. 
1975); §§ 19(h)(l), (2), (3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78s(h)(1), (2), (3) (Supp. Aug. 
1975). 
80. It would, however, relieve the Commission from having to show that the 
sanction was not punishment. 
81. The case study revealed that some factors appeared to have been overlooked 
in the decision process, even though the factors were discoverable. See SEC Case 
Study, supra note 6, at 496; note is & text at notes 24-25 supra. 
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be taken more seriously than others.82 In addition to the type of of-
fense committed, other factors tend to distinguish the more from the 
less serious offenses. One such factor is the amount of money in-
volved. Although far from a perfect indicator, the amount of money 
involved may tend to help identify whether a particular offense poses 
a threat to investors. One finding of the case study, however, was that, 
though the Commission has acknowledged the importance of this 
factor in determining appropriate sanctions, 83 the amount of money 
involved was considered in relatively few cases.84 The same observa-
tion can be made about two other factors that describe and thus 
distinguish offenses-the number of investors involved and the geo-
graphic scope of the violation. All else being equal, an offense that 
involves relatively few investors and that is limited to one transaction 
in one town may reasonably be viewed as a less serious threat to 
investors than an offense involving thousands of investors nationally. 
As in the case of the amount of money, however, these factors appear 
to have been considered in far fewer cases than may have been 
possible. 85 Since the Commission clearly recongnizes the potential 
relevance of these factors, 86 a rule that seeks to limit the Commis-
sion's discretion in order to ensure more uniform consideration of 
relevant factors ought to include them as appropriate for the Commis-
sion's consideration. 
The amount of money involved in an offense is a factor that is 
related to, but distinguishable from, the ultimate financial loss to 
investors. Although a large sum may have been involved, there may 
have been no resulting loss to investors; for example, a violation of 
the net capital rule87 involves "an amount of money," but does not 
necessarily result in any loss to investors. Even in those cases in 
which the offense involves placing the investor's money in direct 
82. The case study grouped offenses in eight categories: (1) egregious fraud; (2) 
less egregious fraud; (3) egregious fraud and nonfraud combined; ( 4) less egregious 
fraud and nonfraud combined; (5) sale of unregistered securities; (6) back office 
violations; (7) nonfraud combining (5) and (6) above; and (8) failure to supervise. 
In general, it was found that the more serious the offense, the more severe the 
sanction. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 477-84. 
83. See, e.g., Irving Friedman, 43 S.E.C. 314,323 n.19 (1967). 
84. Only 16.6 per cent of all cases mentioned the amount of money. See SEC 
Case Study, supra note 6, at 482. 
85. Only 5.5 per cent of the cases mentioned the number of investors involved, 
and only 8.4 per cent mentioned the geographic scope. See SEC Case Study, supra 
note 6, at 483. 
86. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. SEC Exchange Act Release 
No. 8333 (June 14, 1968) (geographic scope); Thomas Brown, m, 43 S.E.C. 28.5 
(1967) (number of investors). 
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1975). The rule is intended to ensure a firm's 
liquidity by requiring that aggregate indebtedness not exceed 2000 per cent of its net 
capital, 
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jeopardy, such as sales by fraud, there may be no loss if the offender 
has made, or has offered :to make, restitution to the victim. 88 If 
restitution is allowed to become an automatic mitigating factor, how-
ever, the protection of investors may ultimately be threatened because 
brokers may come to consider restitution merely a cost of doing 
business, 89 Nevertheless, the offender's willingness to make restitu-
tion is a relevant factor when considered in conjunction with the 
primary purpose of sanctions-to protect investors rather than to 
punish offenders. 
In addition to factors that describe the offense, the Commission 
has taken into account certain factors that tend to describe the 
offender; one such factor is the offender's attitude. The Exchange 
Act requires only that the misconduct be intentional before a sanction 
is imposed. 90 However, if the Commission finds a degree of willful-
ness greater than the statutory minimum, it should view this finding 
as relevant to the sanctioning purpose-the protection of investors. 01 
The offender's attitude may also be considered in terms of his 
willingness to reform. For example, a broker-dealer who has violated 
the Exchange Act by failing to supervise properly the sales prac-
tices of registered representatives may indicate his willingness to 
comply with the Act's requirements in the future by instituting im-
proved procedures to supervise the sales force. 02 Similarly, the will-
ingness of an offender to be retrained and closely supervised as a 
condition to being permitted to reenter the business indicates an 
attitude consistent with the Commission's remedial objectives.03 Fur-
thermore, an offender's willingness to consent to the imposition of a 
sanction may be an appropriate determinant of sanction severity to 
the extent that it demonstrates recognition of the law's requirements 
and a willingness to comply in the future. 94 
In addition to factors that describe the offender's attitude, the 
Commission also considers factors that describe his status. Former 
violations, for instance, are relevant to the extent that they tend to 
establish the likelihood of future offenses and, therefore, indicate 
88. See, e.g., Boettcher & Co., 43 S.E.C. 875 (1968). 
89. Cf. GoJdschmid, supra note 78, at 946-47 (money penalties). 
90. It has been said that willfulness "characterizes an act as being neither 
unintentional or inadvertent." E. Wmss, supra note 9, at 206. 
91. Id. at 204. 
92. See, e.g., Boettcher & Co., 43 S.E.C. 875 (1968). 
93. See, e.g., Roy V. Montgomery, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8223 (Jan. 3, 
1968). Indeed, willingness to reform was one of the factors most likely to mitigate 
the severity of sanction. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 486-87. 
94. Willingness to consent appeared in 66.3 per cent of all cases and tended to be 
associated with a reduction in expulsion rate. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 
485-86. 
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future danger to investors generally.95 The age and experience of the 
offender can also be relevant;96 however, the case study revealed 
that these factors were not considered by the Commission as often 
as was possible.97 Accordingly, including age and experience as 
factors required by rule to be considered by the Commission, might 
help to ensure that they are weighed when appropriate. The individ-
ual's general reputation in the industry is yet another factor that, 
when objectively identified, ought to be, and is, considered by the 
Commission in imposing sanctions. 98 
The factors described above are not necessarily the only ones that 
might be appropriate for the Commission's consideration. They are, 
however, relied upon by the Commission, and in many cases they are 
relevant factors in determining a sanction that will further the public 
interest. Moreover, no single factor is controlling; the combination 
of factors in any particular case must be considered to determine the 
appropriate weight to be given to each factor individually. Although 
it might be possible for regulated individuals to distill from SEC 
practice those factors the Commission is likely to consider, a rule is 
needed that will articulate the relevant factors that affect sanction 
severity so that they may be both known and knowable; furthermore, 
such a rule should require that the Commission consider these factors 
in each case in which they are present, thereby providing a formal 
standard to guide discretion that will be applicable to all. The 
formulation and publication of such a rule would not only guide the 
Commission, but would also serve as notice to regulated parties and 
provide a basis for judicial review. 
3. Procedural Requirements of a Rule 
If a rule of the type described is to provide an effective limit on 
the exercise of sanctioning discretion, it should include a requirement 
that the Commission make findings, supported by substantial evi-
95. See, e.g., Strathmore Sec., Inc., 43 S.E.C. 575, 591 (1967). 
96. See, e.g., David G. Baird, 43 S.E.C."815 (1968). 
97. Age was mentioned in 2.6 per cent of the cases; experience was mentioned in 
11.6 per cent of the cases. SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 491. 
98. Id. at 490-91. This is not to suggest that reputation, in and of itself, should 
determine the necessity of a sanction. Reputation is a valid criterion only when it 
tends to assist the Commission in determining the remedial necessity of a sanction. 
Thus, good reputation subsequent to a violation may be relevant to the ultimate 
determination of rehabilitation. Likewise, a history of scrapes with the law may 
indicate a pattern of behavior that is likely to endanger investors in the future. There 
is no question that reputation is a slippery factor. Only when reliable, objective 
evidence of reputation tends to support the remedial determination should it be 
considered. 
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dence, 99 with regard to each relevant factor stated in the rule. Fur-
ther, the Commission should be required to articulate, as part of its 
reasons for imposing a sanction, the sanctioning purpose hoped to be 
achieved.100 These procedural requirements are essential if the 
scheme is to be workable. In order to make judicial review possible, 
the Commission must support its application of the formal standard 
by indicating its factual findings and the relation between those 
findings and the sanction imposed. 
It is true, of course, that the SEC already makes findings and 
offers reasons for its sanctions pursuant to the public interest stan-
dard. However, presently the Commission is not required to account 
for all of the factors that past practice has established are relevant in 
determining an appropriate sanction in similar cases; nor is it re-
quired to articulate all of the factors that it considered relevant in 
imposing a sanction in the particular case. Rather, under existing 
practice, the Commission is free to select some factors as a justifica-
tion for its decision while ignoring (or failing to mention) others. 
Thus, the case study showed that, while all cases disclosed some 
factors upon which the sanctioning decision was based, few, if any, 
cases accounted for all of the discoverable factors that the SEC had 
found relevant in similar cases. Consequently, the rational basis for 
the Commission's sanctioning decisions is suspect. Moreover, the 
case study showed that the factors utilized by the Commission were 
applied inconsistently, resulting in an over-all disparity. 
The deficiencies in the Commission's present practice can be 
illustrated by considering two approaches to sanctioning based on the 
following hypothetical: An experienced, middle-aged salesman with 
no prior record is found to have sold $100,000 worth of securities by 
fraud. He has offered to make restitution. Under the first approach, 
the salesman would receive thirty-days suspension because he has 
been employed as a salesman for twenty-five years without any prior 
violation, and no loss has been suffered by the investors. Under this 
approach, suspension is viewed as an adequate remedy to protect 
investors and further the public interest. Under the second approach, 
the salesman would be expelled. In spite of his offer of restitution, 
99. The substantial evidence standard is generally used by the courts in reviewing 
findings of fact made by federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970). 
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence 
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidat-
ed Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). A reviewing court must sustain 
the agency's findings if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record 
considered as a whole, taking "into account whatever in the record fairly detracts 
from its weight" Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). 
100. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 43. 
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the seriousness of the offense and large amount of money involved 
would require :that the salesman be barred from association with a 
broker-dealer for the protection of investors. When viewed in isola-
tion, either of these alternatives is rational. Note, however, that 
under the first approach the amount of money involved and the 
seriousness of the offense are ignored and the emphasis is instead 
placed on the lack of a prior record and the offer of restitution. On 
the other hand, under the second approach, the amount of money 
involved and the seriousness of the offense are held to outweigh the 
offer of restitution, and the offender's long spotless record is ignored. 
Moreover, neither approach considers the offender's intent or the 
number of investors involved. Thus, neither takes into account all of 
the discoverable factors that the SEC has found relevant in similar 
circumstances. Finally, by failing to account for all of the relevant 
factors, neither approach provides a rationale that adequately explains 
the purpose or necessity for the particular sanction imposed. The 
result is inconsistent treatment, not of arguably similar cases, but of 
the same case.101 
The rule that will be proposed will not automatically remove all 
elements of disparity and inconsistency from the sanctioning process. 
Nonetheless, a requirement that the Commission make findings with 
regard to each relevant factor stated in the rule, and support the 
imposition of a sanction with reasons in light of those factors, will aid 
in the elimination of gross disparities and unreasoned decisions. 
C. A Proposed Rule and Statutory Amendment 
In light of the preceding discussion and the findings of the case 
study, it is recommended that the Commission (by rule) or Congress 
(by amendment to ·the Exchange Act) formulate standards to guide 
the exercise of SEC sanctioning discretion. Section 23(a) of the 
Exchange Act102 empowers the Commission to promulgate such a 
rule, and the following may be a reasonable starting point: 
Proposed Rule 15b4-1 
Imposition of Sanctions Under Sections 15(b) and 19(h)(2), (3) 
of the Act: 
(a) In determining an appropriate sanction in any proceeding 
pursuant to sections 15(b) or 19(h)(2), (3) of the Act, the Com-
mission will support its decision to impose ( or not to impose) a sanc-
101. For examples of this kind of use of the factors, compare Van Alstyne, Noel 
& Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969), with Charles P. Lawrence, 43 S.E.C. 607 (1967). 
102. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a), 15 U.S.C, § 78w(a) (1970). 
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tion with adequate findings and reasons to show that it has considered 
the purpose of the sanction, as well as all relevant factors describing 
the offense and the offender. 
(1) The remedial purposes that a sanction may serve shall 
include: (A) the protection of investors; (B) the general and 
special deterrence of future violations; and (C) the encourage-
ment of voluntary compliance with the Act or the rehabilitation 
of offenders. 
(2) Factors describing the offense shall include: (A) the 
seriousness of the offense; (B) the number of investors involved 
or affected; (C) the amount of money involved; (D) the finan-
cial losss, actual or threatened, to investors; (E) the profit to the 
offender; (F) the geographic scope of the violation; and (G) all 
other relevant factors consistent with the purposes of this Act. 
(3) Factors describing the offender shall include: (A) 
former violations; (B) general reputation in the industry; (C) 
age and experience in the securities business; (D) willfulness of 
the offense; (E) willingness to reform or make restitution; and 
(F) all other relevant factors consistent with the purpose of this 
Act. 
(b) In the case of an individual, bar will be an appropriate sanc-
tion where---
(1) there is a reasonable likelihood that the respondent will 
continue to violate the securities laws; or 
(2) there was an intentional or gross disregard for the re-
quirement of the securities laws; or 
(3) for other good cause shown. 
(c) In the case of a registered broker-dealer, revocation will be 
an appropriate sanction where--
(1) there was substantial participation by management in the 
violation under circumstances stated in (b) above; or 
(2) there was gross disregard of the duty to supervise pre-
scribed by Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Act; or 
(3) for other good cause shown. 
(d) In the case of financial loss to investors, restitution or an of-
fer of restitution will not mitigate the offense, except for good cause 
shown, when bar or revocation would otherwise be an appropriate 
sanction pursuant to the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this rule. 
(e) Any person whose registration has been revoked or who has 
been barred from association with a broker-dealer may petition the 
Commission for a hearing to consider readmission to •the securities 
business. No such petition may be considered earlier than one year 
after the imposition of the sanction. The Commission will support 
its decision to deny a hearing, or to deny readmission after a hearing, 
with finqings and conclusions not inconsistent with the purpose of this 
Act or this rule. 
March 1976] Controlling Administrative Sanctions 733 
(f) In any proceedings pursuant to this rule, the Com.mission will 
explain departures from prior policy, whether that policy is embodied 
in written opinions or otherwise. 
The proposed rule is designed to limit the exercise of Commission 
discretion without sacrificing the necessary element of flexibility. It 
imposes two principal obligations upon the Commission. First, the 
Commission must make findings that describe both the offense and 
the offender. Second, the Commission must demonstrate the neces-
sity of imposing a sanction in light of its findings and the remedial 
purposes served by sanctions. In general, the rule requires the SEC 
to base its decision on findings supported by substantial evidence and 
to offer reasons for its conclusion consistent with the statutory pur-
pose. Departures from some of the rule's specific requirements are 
permitted when the SEC can demonstrate that such departures are 
not inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the Act and adminis-
trative sanctions generally. The rule thus provides not only a guide 
for the Commission, but also a basis for judicial review. 
Paragraphs (b) and ( c) of the rule are intended to regularize the 
basic circumstances in which bar and revocation are appropriate. 
They attempt to avoid an emphasis, inadvertent or otherwise, on 
punishment for the sake of punishment. Paragraph ( e) is based on 
the same remedial philosophy. It recognizes that a given offender 
may show that he is no longer a threat either to investors or to the 
maintenance of fair markets.103 The existing concept -inherent in 
revocation or bar-once a danger to investors, always a danger to 
investors--does not accord with reality; this notion of the "incorrigi-
ble" offender seems to shift the emphasis to punishment as the 
primary sanctioning purpose.104 
Paragraph (d) is intended to ensure that restitution will serve as a 
mitigating factor only in those cases in which it is supportive of the 
statutory purpose. Paragraph (f) is intended to assist in developing 
reasonable certainty and consistency in the sanctioning process with-
out depriving the Commission of the flexibility necessary to adjust its 
policies to changing industry circumstances and enforcement needs. 
The practical question, of course, is whether the SEC (or Con-
gress) will proceed along the lines suggested on its own motion. The 
remainder of this Article is concerned with the judicial action that 
may appropriately be taken if the SEC does not so respond. 
103. The Commission already acknowledges the validity of this general concept in 
a sanction it "created": bar with the right to petition for re-entry. See, e.g., Ellis 
Friend, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,026 (Sept. 24, 1974); Cenco Investors & 
Associates, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 10,962 (Aug. 14, 1974); Cortlandt 
Investing Corp., 44 S.E.C. 45 (1969). 
104, See, e.g., Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970), 
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IV. JUDICIAL CoNTROL OF SANCTIONING DISCRETION 
The role of the judiciary in controlling the exercise of administra-
tive sanctioning discretion will necessarily vary depending upon the 
action (or inaction) taken by Congress and the SEC. Thus, we must 
first ask whether the courts can require either Congress or the SEC to 
articulate formal standards and whether such standards, if required, 
must be embodied in formal regulations. Second, we must focus on 
the problem of judicial review of standards that have been adopted by 
the SEC. Finally, we must examine some of the constitutional 
difficulties that may be raised by present SEC sanctioning practice. 
A. 1 udicial Requirement of Standards To Guide Discretion 
A judicial requirement of known standards to guide sanctioning 
discretion might take either of two forms. First, the courts might 
resurrect or modify the nondelegation doctrine in order to require 
Congress or the Commission to promulgate standards in the form of 
regulations; second, the courts might require that sanctioning stan-
dards be articulated, at a minimum, via agency adjudication. 
1. The N ondelegation Doctrine as a Vehicle for Requiring Standards 
Could ·the courts utilize the nondelegation doctrine in order to 
require Congress to set forth meaningful sanctioning standards in the 
Exchange Act? Professor Davis, perhaps speaking for a majority, 
has said that "[t]he non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete 
failure . . . . The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that 
the . . . doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to 
protect against arbitrary administrative power."105 In spite of such 
sentiments, at least one distinguished jurist, Judge Wright, believes 
that "the reported demise of the doctrine is a bit premature."100 
Although Judge Wright rejects the proposition that Congress cannot 
delegate any legislative power to the executive branch or an independ-
ent agency, he has stated that "Congress should [not] be permitted, 
in effect, to vote itself out of business"107 by passing on to nonelected 
officials the power to determine fundamental policy. He suggests 
that the nondelegation doctrine, "[a]t its core, . • . is based on the 
notion that agency action must occur within the context of a rule of 
law previously formulated by a legislative body."108 Accordingly, he 
105. K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00, at 40 (Supp. 1970). 
106. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE LJ. 515, 582 (1972). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 583. 
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cites with approval the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Ari-
zona v. California100-an opinion that suggests that the issue is not 
the delegation of legislative power per se, but the delegation of "un-
restrained authority."110 Justice Harlan further suggests that the doc-
trine so understood serves two purposes: "First, it insures that the 
fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an 
appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the 
people. Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an 
exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against 
which to judge the official action that has been challenged."111 
The medts of Justice Harlan's second purpose seem self-evident. 
The merits of his first purpose, however, depend on the use of the 
words "fundamental policy" to distinguish those decisions that may 
not be made by an appointed official from those decisions that may 
be so made. Apparently, the words are used to avoid the clearly 
erroneous position that the Constititution forbids any policy formula-
tion by a body other than Congress.112 The problem, though, is 
determining the difference between a "fundamental policy" and any 
other kind of policy. Are the standards that guide sanctioning 
practice themselves matters of fundamental policy that must be set by 
Congress and not by the SEC?113 Or is the fundamental policy 
involved only that the s_ecurities industry be regulated and that sanc-
tions for violations be imposed? If, as is likely, it is the second 
question that must be answered in the affirmative, then it would seem 
that Congress has fulfilled its obligation, and the courts, even accept-
ing Justice Harlan's theory, should not,use the nondelegation doctrine 
to require Congress to articulate standards to guide SEC sanctioning 
discretion. 
An early claim that the SEC's sanctioning power was an unlawful 
delegation "because the statute declares no standards to guide" the 
selection of an appropriate sanction was rejected by the Second 
Circuit.114 In that case, Judge Swan noted that "Congress has de-
fined the conduct that is unlawful . . . ,"115 and the " 'protection of 
investors' is a sufficiently definite criterion to guide the Commis-
109. 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963). 
110. 373 U.S. at 626. 
111. 373 U.S. at 626 (emphasis omitted). 
112. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00-3 (Supp. 1970) (surveying the 
traditional practice of delegating power). 
113. If this is the case, it would surely seem inconsistent with judicial approval of 
standardless sentencing authority for juries. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971). 
114. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (1940). 
115. 112 F.2d at 94. 
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sion."116 Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 
public interest standard in an SEC case, noting not only that it would 
be "unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe 
detailed rules . . • ,"117 but also that the standard was "constitution-
ally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy."118 
Presumably, the Court meant by "general policy" the same thing that 
Justice Harlan meant by "fundamental policy." It is unlikely, there-
fore, that the traditional formulation of the nondelegation doctrine 
can be utilized in this context. 
A related question is whether the courts can use a variation of the 
nondelegation doctrine to require the SEC to promulgate rules. Pro-
fessor Davis has suggested that the courts should modify the nondele-
gation doctrine by requiring agencies to engage in rule-making to 
supply the necessary standards that are · otherwise lacking in the 
enabling legislation. Thus, rather than use the nondelegation doc-
trine to strike down legislation in which Congress has not supplied 
adequate standards, Professor Davis would use the doctrine to require 
the agencies to promulgate more definite standards.119 
Although Professor Davis' suggestion is innovative, it has been 
seriously criticized.120' Its problems are both practical and theoreti-
cal. Some commentators have focused on the practical problems of 
required rule-making.121 Would mandated rule-making, for instance, 
obligate an agency to engage in rule-making procedures whenever the 
enabling legislation granted discretion, or would the agencies con-
tinue to be able to develop some standards in adjudicative proceed-
ings? In any event, how would. the courts determine whether the rule 
promulgated was as specific as was necessary or feasible? Would 
required rule-making result in unreasonable demands upon the lim-
ited resources of already overworked agencies? 
Answers to these questions depend, to a large extent, upon the 
particular agency (as well as the particular functions of an agency) 
under consideration.122 For example, as applied to the SEC's sanc-
tioning practice, a requirement that the agency utilize rule-making 
procedures to formulate standards to guide discretion would not place 
116. 112 F.2d at 95. Judge Swan relied on a Supreme Court decision that had 
held that the 1cpublic interest" standard (for the ICC) "is not a concept without 
ascertainable criteria" in the context of the obvious statutory purposes. New York 
Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932). 
117. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
118. 329 U.S. at 105. 
119. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 27-51. 
120. See, e.g., Reiss, supra note 38. 
121. See Sofaer, supra note 32, at 1309-12. 
122, See generally text at notes 30·43 supra, 
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an unreasonable demand on the resources of the agency; rather, it 
would require the SEC to codify, regularize, and improve its existing 
practices in the form of a public rule. In the long run, the rule would 
probably result in a time savings because the inquiry of the decision-
maker, as well as affected parties, would be directed to the rule as a 
guide to argumentation and opinion-writing. 
Further, the standards promulgated under required rule-making 
would not necessarily result in the elimination of adjudication as a 
proper vehicle for developing policy and standards. The rule recom-
mended above, for instance, specifically guarantees the SEC the 
flexibility to develop standards in adjudication. When the developing 
policy of an agency becomes routinized, however, all parties con-
cerned benefit by the codification and publication of the policy in ,a 
formal rule; such publication is an aid not only to efficiency, but also 
to judicial review of the sanctioning process.123 The potential danger 
in required rule-making is not that the rules ultimately 'adopted would 
necessarily eliminate flexibility, but that a rigid application of the 
rule-making requirement-if, for example, the courts required all 
discretion to be controlled by standards in the form of rules124--could 
eliminate the agency's flexibility to decide whether to proceed by 
adjudication or rule-making. Such a result, however unlikely, would 
be clearly undesirable. Rule-making (as opposed to adjudication) is 
not necessarily desirable, practicable, or necessary in every situation 
in which an agency has discretion.1215 Judicial intervention to deter-
mine when an agency ought to develop policy by rule-making rather 
than adjudication should be guided by existing judicial tests that 
recognize the appropriate role for both forms of law-making.126 
Although the practical problems that might arise from required 
rule-making would not cause insurmountable difficulties .in the case 
of SEC sanctioning practice, required rule-making based on the 
nondelegation doctrine has a basic theoretical weakness. Regardless 
of one's preferred approach to nondelegation, the doctrine is not, as a 
matter of definition, responsive to the problem. If nondelegation 
means that Congress may not delegate legislative power, 127 then the 
123. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 
(D.C. Cir. 1971), where Chief Judge Bazelon notes that "principled decision-making" 
by agencies would "diminish the importance of judicial review • • • ." 
124. The courts have never adopted this position. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance 
Agents' Intl. Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960). ' 
125. See text at notes 30-43 supra. 
126. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). See generally 
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and 
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 485 (1970). 
127. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935). 
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problem of an unlawful delegation of authority is not cured by 
permitting an agency to determine standards to delimit the bounda-
ries of power that it should not have been given to begin with. If, on 
the other hand, it is both constitutionally proper and also, as a 
practical matter, necessary that Congress delegate legislative power to 
an agency (assuming Congress has made the fundamental policy 
determinations),128 then delegation is no longer the issue. The prob-
lem is not a question of the validity of delegating power, but of 
controlling the exercise of agency power that has been validly dele-
gated. If, as Professor Davis suggests, the nondelegation doctrine 
"had to fail, should have failed, and did fail,"120 why not be done 
with it? Why twist the doctrine further by attempting to apply it to a 
problem for which it was never intended? The attempt to find a basis 
for requiring standards to guide the exercise of agency discretion 
ought not to be rooted in an unnecessary complication of past mis-
takes. 
To reject the nondelegation doctrine as a basis for mandating 
either agency rule-making or legislative action, however, is not to say 
that there is no judicial role in this area. The appropriate and logical 
source of a requirement that an agency articulate standards to guide 
sanctioning discretion is the due process clause.130 
2. The Due Process Clause as a Vehicle for Requiring Standards 
The due process clause is "intended to secure the individual from 
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government."131 Although the 
way in which this principle applies to administrative agency activities 
is not always clear, it has been established that, for example, an 
administrative proceeding to revoke a license is subject to due process 
requirements.132 Thus, at a minimu~, the licensee is entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner."133 Due process also includes the right to have 
one's conduct judged by known standards, for, almost by definition, 
without standards there is no law.134 Power without standards to 
128. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
129. K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00-3, at 46 (Supp. 1970). 
130. Professor Davis predicts that the nondelegation doctrine (as modified to 
require agency rule-making) "will merge with the concept of due process •••• " Id., 
§ 2.00-6, at 58. Surely the standards requirement ought to begin with the due process 
clause, not grow out of nondelegation. 
131. Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 17-U.S. 235,244 (1819). 
132. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Schware v. Board 
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,238 (1957). 
133. Armstrong v. -Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
134. See Wright, supra note 106, at 589. 
March 1976] Controlling Administrative Sanctions 739 
govern its exercise is "an intolerable invitation to abuse," and "[f]or 
this reason alone due process requires . • . 'ascertainable standards'. 
"135 
The question remains, however, whether these principles should 
be applied to administrative sanctioning practice. Although a court 
would hardly tolerate an agency's determination of misconduct unless 
there existed a meaningful and ascertainable standard by which to 
measure the offender's actions, courts tend to be satisfied with very 
little in the way of standards to guide sanction selection; often, all that 
is necessary is the agency's certification that the particular sanction is 
necessary "in the public interest." Thus, in reviewing an SEC sanc-
tion, the Second Circuit dismissed the offenders' challenge simply by 
concluding that "the sanctions imposed upon the petitioners were well 
within the Commission's discretion."136 The fact that a sanction is 
within the range of the Commission's discretion, however, ought not 
to end the due process inquiry. Did the agency demonstrate the 
necessity of the particular sanction imposed? What factors did the 
agency consider? How have comparable cases been dealt with? What 
is the nature of the offense and the offender? In short, what stan-
dards, if any, controlled the sanction's selection? The courts' reluct-
ance to require the articulation of the standards and factors that guide 
the exercise of sanctioning discretion is, in effect, judicial acquies-
cence in governmental taking of property and liberty without stan-
dards, which is to say, without law. 
It is an insufficient answer to say that judicial reluctance to 
require the articulation of standards for sanctioning decisions is due 
to the numerous and diverse factors that lead to a particular sanction-
ing choice.137 Numerous and diverse factors must be considered by 
administrative agencies in many of the decisions that are made in the 
process of adjudication, and such adjudicative decisions are often no 
less complex than the decision to impose a sanction. The practicabil-
ity of articulating standards in the light of statutory purposes, the 
SEC's need for flexibility, and the public interest in consistency have 
been discussed above.138 Further, the fear that reviewing courts will 
substitute their opinions for the sanctioning decisions of the agency139 
should not insulate courts from fulfilling their duty to ensure that 
135. Holmes v. Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968), quoting 
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964). 
136. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (1967). 
137. Cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,204 (1971). 
138. See text at notes 30-43 supra. 
139. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concur-
ring). 
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the powers of government are exercised lawfully. The adoption of 
the due process basis for review of sanctions requires only that the 
reviewing court insist that valid criteria be articulated and applied by 
the agency in :r;eaching its decision. 
To say that the courts should require agencies to articulate stan-
dards is not necessarily to say that those standards must be articulated 
in formal regulations.140 After all, rules governing conduct can be 
known and knowable not only if they are articulated in statutes and 
regulations, but also if they can be found in the opinions of judicial 
and quasi-judicial bodies. At a minimum, however, standards must be 
fairly deducible from such opinions. In this context, the importance 
of a requirement that agency sanctions be supported by clear reasons 
is apparent:141 A statement of reasons both provides the necessary 
basis for judicial review142 and serves the broader jurisprudential 
purpose of making the law known and knowable. 
Although the statement of reasons requirement can be supported 
simply by reference to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 143 its basis in the due process clause should be acknowledged so 
that it cannot be construed to be merely a matter of legislative grace. 
At least one Supreme Court decision has based the statement of 
reasons requirement on the due process clause.144 Indeed, it would 
be ironic if a defendant has the right to be told of the charges against 
him, but no corresponding right to be told why a sanction was being 
imposed. 
Whatever else happens in the legal process, the imposition of a 
140. Both Professor Davis and Judge Wright suggest that due process might 
provide a basis for requiring rule-making. See K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 2.00-6 
(Supp. 1970); Wright, supra note 106, at 588. 
141. It is generally held that a court may require a statement of reasons from an 
agency. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943). Furthermore, the 
courts have required agencies to state their reasons clearly. See Secretary of 
Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645, 654 (1954); United States v. Chicago, M., 
St. P. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935); Melody Music, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 
730, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Berko v. SEC, 297 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1961); Kahn v. 
SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring). 
142. The practical significance of a statement of reasons as a prerequisite to 
meaningful judicial review is obvious. As Justice Cardozo stated, "We must know 
what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or 
wrong." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935). 
143. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970). The Act's reasons requirement does not apply to 
all agency actions, but it does apply to the SEC's sanctioning process under considera-
tion because the imposition of sanctions represents agency action that is "required by 
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing • • • ." 
5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970). The Exchange Act specifically requires a finding of the 
public interest prior to the imposition of a sanction, "on the record after notice and 
opportunity for hearing •••• " Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15(b) (4), (5), 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o(b)(4), (5) (Supp. Aug. 1975). 
144. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 551 (1966). 
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sanction is, from the respondent's point of view, probably the single 
most important event; however, under existing conditions, it is the 
one event that is least controlled by the rule of law. If a system of 
law and due process of law are to be given meaning, they must be 
defined in terms of the reasoned regulation of human conduct by 
known standards. Reason alone will not guarantee that the law will 
be right in any absolute sense, but the failure to include articulated 
reasons and standards as a requirement of government action makes 
fully possible arbitrary, capricious, and, thus, unlawful government 
action. Even if standards and reasons are articulated, however, the 
possibility of abuse is not necessarily eliminated, since the standards 
adopted (and the reasons articulated in applying such standards) 
must be proper and must be properly utilized. 
B. Judicial Review of Administrative Formulation and Utilization 
of Standards 
Although the debate continues regarding the extent to which the 
Administrative Procedure Act precludes review of matters committed 
to agency discretion, 145 it appears that SEC sanctioning discretion is 
reviewable for abuse.146 As noted briefly above,147 however, the 
145. The source of the debate is the apparent conflict between two provisions of 
the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (19'70), which precludes review "to the extent that 
..• agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 
(A) (1970), which requires a reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency 
actions, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law •.•. " A spirited dialogue on 
the question was engaged in by Professor Davis and Raoul Berger. See Berger, 
Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965); 
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. 
REV. 783 (1966); Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. 
REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to Professor 
Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 816 (1966); Davis, Administrative 
Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (1966); Berger, Administrative 
Arbitrariness-A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REv. 601 (1967); Davis, Administrative 
Arbitrariness Is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REY. 643 ·(1967). While the 
Supreme Court has held that the exception from reviewability is a narrow one, see 
Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971), that case 
does not completely resolve the conflict. See Mahinka, The Problem of Nonreviewa-
bility: Judicial Control of Action Committed to Agency Discretion, 20 VILL. L. REV. 
1 (1974). 
146. See, e.g., Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1970); Armstrong, Jones & 
Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359,365 (6th Cir. 1970); Nees v. SEC, 414 F.2d 211,217 (9th 
Cir. 1969). 
Even if one follows Professor Davis' somewhat restrictive interpretation of the 
AP A, SEC sanctioning discretion seems reviewable. Applying Professor Davis' two-
part inquiry for determining reviewability, (1) it is clear that no "congressional intent 
is discernible to make [a sanction] unreviewable," and (2) "the subject matter is ... 
[appropriate] for judicial consideration." K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 965 
(Supp. 1970). There is no language in section 15(b) of the Exchange Act that 
precludes review of sanctions, and section 25(a) of the Exchange Act specifically 
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courts seem unwilling to do much more than ensure that the sanction 
imposed is within the permissible statutory range of discretion.148 
Is it practicable for the courts to do more? In Wong Wing Hang 
v. Immigration and Natural.ization Service,149 Judge Friendly found 
that the courts could invalidate discretionary agency actions that 
"were made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed 
from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as 
an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group, or, 
. . . on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended 
to make relevant.' "150 Although Judge Friendly did not attempt to 
provide a "comprehensive definition"151 of abuse of agency discre-
tion, the formula that he did provide seems, to suggest two primary 
bases for judicial inquiry. First, discretionary action must be rational, 
and second, discretionary action must be consistent with relevant 
legal standards, whether the source of such standards is administra-
tive, statutory, or constitutional.152 If this formula is applied to SEC 
provides for review of Commission orders. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78y(a) (Supp. Aug, 
1975). Further, the subject matter seems to require the kind of inquiries that 
"legally-trained judges, limited to the process that courts customarily use, are qualified 
to do." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExr § 28.05, at 515-16 (1972), Moreover, 
if due process requires standards to guide discretion, there would appear to be "law to 
apply,'' the test suggested by the Supreme Court in Citizens To Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971). 
147. See text at note 136 supra. 
148. See, e.g., Don D. Anderson & Co. v. SEC, 423 F.2d 813, 817 (10th Cir, 
1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 365 (6th Cir. 1970); Nees v. 
SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 217 (9th Cir. 1969); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 
1967); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965); Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d 160, 163-
64 (9th Cir. 1956); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir, 1940). 
A 1973 Supreme Court decision reiterated an arguably broader rule for reviewing 
an administrative sanction. A sanction may be reviewed only if " 'unwarranted in law 
or . . . without justification in fact • • • .' " Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 
411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973 ), quoting American Power & Light Co, v. SEC, 329 U.S. 
90, 112-13 (1946). Scrutiny of the factual basis for imposing a sanction is clearly 
justified. See text at note 176 infra. Whether a sanction is "warranted in law" 
would seem to permit an inquiry broader than a mere determination that the sanction 
is within the permissible statutory range of choices. The possible avenues such a 
broadened inquiry might take is the subject of the discussion that follows. Tho 
application of the ''warrant in law" test in Butz was limited to a determination that 
the sanction there imposed was within the Secretary's range of authority and that such 
a sanction was "not rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more severe 
than sanctions imposed in other cases." 411 U.S. at 187. 
149. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966). 
150. 360 F.2d at 719, quoting United States ex rel, Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 
F.2d 489,491 (2d Cir. 1950). 
151. 360 F.2d at 719. 
152. The Wong case itself exemplifies the first principle: "Wong contends that 
the determination here • • . is internally inconsistent-he was found to have pos-
sessed 'good moral character' during the several years prior to his application , • • yet 
was faulted for prevarication . . . during that same period," 360 F.2d at 719. Judge 
Friendly, in effect, gives three examples of the second principle: (1) inexplicable 
departures from agency policy; (2) invidious discrimination (constitutional); and (3) 
considerations Congress could not have intended to make relevant (statutory), 
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sanctioning discretion, it is obvious that a particular sanction either 
may lack a rational explanation or may be inconsistent with agency 
policy or with statutory or constitutional principles. It would seem, 
then, that SEC sanctioning discretion ought to be subject to a level of 
judicial inquiry that extends beyond the initial determination that the 
sanction is within the statutory range of the Commission's discre-
tion.15s 
Undoubtedly, the reluctance of the federal judiciary to inquire 
into the propriety of a particular agency sanction is an outgrowth, in 
part, of its experience in reviewing criminal sanctions. It has been 
said that, "[i]f there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which 
is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a 
sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute."154 If one 
closely inspects the actual federal practice, however, that observation 
appears to be a slight overstatement. Although federal appellate 
courts generally have been reluctant to review the propriety of a 
sentence that is within the statutory limits, 155 they have been willing 
to intervene on occasion.156 A recent Sixth Circuit opinion, United 
States v. Daniels,151 suggests .the possible bases for review of criminal 
sentences and, in so doing, offers a framework for review of adminis-
trative sanctions as well. 
The court in Daniels suggested two exceptions to the general 
federal rule of nonreviewability:158 First, the reviewing court may 
ascertain whether the trial court relied upon proper factors; and, 
second, the reviewing court may determine whether the trial court 
evaluated all of the relevant information about the offender in light of 
the proper factors.159 The court further suggested that the factors to 
be considered include appropriate sentencing purposes, such as reha-
bilitation, protection of the public, discipline of the offender, and 
deterrence of others.160 Thus, the court provided a test for reviewing 
the appropriateness of a sentence even in cases in which the sentence 
153. The power to sanction is not "the authority • . . to act blindly or arbi-
trarily ... [or] in disregard of ... limitations recognized by law." .ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE Ac::r, l.EGISLATIVE HISTORY, s. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 
at 368-69 (1946) (Chairman Walter explaining review provisions of APA prior to 
adoption). 
154. Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930). See United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,447 (1972). 
155. See cases collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R. Fed. 655, 664-69 (1974). 
156. See id. at 685-88. 
157. 446 F.2d 967 (1971). 
158. 446 F.2d at 969, citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). 
159. 446 F.2d at 970. 
160. 446 F.2d at 972, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 n.13 
(1949). 
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is within the permissible statutory range. The object of the test is to 
achieve, as far as is feasible, a sanction that fits the offender.161 
The quality of judicial review of administrative sanctions would 
be improved if the courts (and counsel) were more careful to analyze 
the precise nature of ~ alleged abuse of discretion. The framework 
suggested by the court in Daniels, in combination with Judge Friend-
ly's "definition" of abuse of discretion, can provide the basis for such 
analysis. In general, the court's attention should be directed to two 
aspects of sanctioning practice: the propriety of the standards relied 
upon by the agency in reaching a decision and the propriety of the 
manner in which the standards were utilized. Because each of these 
broad lines of inquiry includes more specific aspects, it is proposed 
that the following outline of the test be used: 
l. Propriety of Sanctioning Standards 
(a) Is the standard consistent with the relevant statutory pur-
poses? 
(b) Is the standard consistent with ,the remedial purposes of 
sanctioning? 
( c) Is the standard consistent with constitutional principles? 
2. ProjJriety of Utiliz.ation of Sanctioning Standards 
(a) Are the agency's findings in respect to -the standard supported 
by substantial evidence? 
(b) Have all of the proper factors and standards been accounted 
for in the agency's findings and reasons? 
( c) Has ,the agency inexplicably departed from its established 
sanctioning policy or practice? 
(d) Are the reasons offered in support of the sanction internally 
consistent?162 
The court's initial step in evaluating the propriety of a standard 
being used by the Commission should be to determine whether the 
standard is consistent with the relevant statutory purposes.108 This 
161. 446 F.2d at 970, citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
162. Professor Davis has made a similar suggestion: "a) determine the reasona• 
bleness of the rules • • • as a guide to discretion, • • • c) ascertain whether the 
particular exercise of discretion arbitrarily departs from the administrative case law, 
. • • f) determine whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence, g) 
determine whether the stated reasons are based upon considerations which are reason-
able and legal." K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 981-82 (Supp. 1970). 
163. This step would appear to be implicit in Judge Friendly'!/ "impermissible 
basis ..• [or] 'considerations that Congress could not have intended • • • ,' " Wong 
Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Judge Celebrezze's "improper factors," United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 970 
(6th Cir. 1971); or Davis' "reasons ••• based upon considerations which ai:e ••• 
legal,'' K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 982 (Supp. 1970). 
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task is essentially one of statutory interpretation and thus is one that is 
clearly appropriate for judicial consideration.164 The basic statutory 
term to be construed in evaluating the propriety of SEC sanctioning 
standards is "the public interest," since SEC sanctions must be im-
posed in light of that statutory standard._ In a different setting, the 
Supreme Court has stated that "the term 'public interest' is not a 
concept without ascertainable criteria . . . "165 and must be con-
strued in light of "[t]he purpose of the Act, the requirements it 
imposes, and the context of the provision in question .... "166 Thus, 
for our purposes, "the public interest'' must be construed in light of 
both the purpose of the Exchange Act (the protection of investors) 
and the context in which the term applies (the imposition of sanc-
tions). Obviously, even so construed, the term leaves the Commis-
sion with a great deal of leeway; however, it at least draws' an initial 
boundary within which the Commission must stay. When the Com-
mission imposes a sanction in reliance upon a factor that describes the 
offense or the offender, that factor must be rationally related to the 
remedial purposes of the Exchange Act.167 Although most of the 
factors relied upon by the Commission do appear to meet this test, 168 
some of the factors used appear to be more questjonable. In particu-
lar, it might ,be appropriate to ask whether the offender's geographic 
location (for example, New York) or professional affiliation (for 
example, NYSE membership) are factors relevant to .the purposes of 
the Exchange Act. 
A second and related inquiry concerning the propriety of an 
agency standard is whether the standard is consistent with appropriate 
sanctioning purposes.169 As in the case of statutory purposes, the 
scope of permissible sanctioning purposes allows the Commission a 
wide range of discretion (and justification) in imposing sanctions. 
164. K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16 at 965 (Supp. 1970). 
165. New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932) 
(interpreting the Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41 Stat. 456). 
166. 287 U.S. at 24. See American Power & Light, Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-
05 (1946). 
167. The SEC must, of coup;e, properly interpret those purposes. Problems of 
interpretation and application of law are discussed in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 
Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpreta-
tion of Statutes, 3 VAND. L REv. 470, 473-75 (1950). 
168. See text at notes 82-98 supra. 
169. This inquiry was of obvious importance to the court in Daniels, which said, 
"[W]e are disturbed by the District Cou11's failure to conceive of the sentencing 
procedure in terms of the modern penological philosophy praised by the United States 
Supreme Court," and listed the following factors as appropriate sentencing considera-
tions: "(a) the ref6rmation of the offender, (b) the protection of society, (c) the 
disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (d) the deterrence of others .•.. " United States 
v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 1971), citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 248 n.13 (1949). 
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Nevertheless, requiring that the standard be measured in light of 
appropriate sanctioning purposes does limit SEC action. In Beck, 
for example, the court of appeals overruled the Commission because 
the purpose of the sanction was punitive and therefore inappro-
priate.170 The topic of appropriate sanctioning purposes was dis-
cussed earlier,171 and there is no need to repeat that analysis here. It 
would seem however, that because sanctioning purposes may affect 
the nature and necessity of a particular sanction in any given case, it 
is appropriate for the courts to inquire about a sanction's purpose.172 
Finally, the court may evaluate the propriety of sanctioning stan-
dards in light of relevant constitutional principles. This line of 
inquiry is consistent with Judge Friendly's statement that an abuse of 
discretion would occur if a decision "rested on an impermissible basis 
such as an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group. 
"173 Judge Friendly's "impermissible basis" standard clearly 
comprehends a challenge to one or more sanctioning standards on the 
ground that such standards are constitutionally defective. Inquiries 
into the constitutional validity of sanctioning standards are particu-
larly appropriate for judicial determination.174 Thus, a standard that 
infringes upon constitutional rights (including, for example, the free-
doms of speech or religion) should be subject to challenge notwith-
standing that the imposition of sanctions is action "committed to 
agency discretion by law."175 
The second broad line of inquiry a court should make in review-
ing an administrative sanction is to evaluate the manner in which 
sanctioning standards are utilized. In the Commission's case, this 
could prove to be the most important inquiry. In evaluating the 
170. Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1970), discussed in text at notes 48-59 
supra. 
171. See text at notes 46-81 supra. 
172. Even if one disagrees with the particular result of the case, Beck demon-
strates the feasibility of such an inquiry. See Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 
1970). In Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187 (1973), the 
Supreme Court implicitly recognized the appropriateness of an inquizy into the 
relation of the sanction to statutozy purpose: "[T]he breadth of the grant of authority 
to impose the sanction strongly implies a congressional purpose to permit the 
Secretazy to impose it to deter repeated violations of the Act, whether intentional or 
negligent." Further, "[t]he Secretary's practice, rather, apparently is to employ that 
sanction as in his judgment best serves to deter violations and achieve the objectives 
of that statute." 411 U.S. at 187-88. Finally, the Court cited approvingly the 
statement of the court of appeals that judicial review is available to determine whether 
the sanction " 'bears a reasonable relation to the practice sought to be eliminated . 
• . . •" 411 U.S. at 186, n.3, quoting 454 F.2d 109, 114 (1972). 
173. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 
(2d Cir. 1966). 
174. See K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 975 (Supp. 1970). 
175. Judge Wright also warns of the danger of standardless regulation that "chills 
the exercise of constitutional rights." Wright, supra note 106, at 589. 
March 1976] Controlling Administrative Sanctions 747 
utilization of a sanctioning standard (assuming that the standard is 
itself proper), a court should initially question whether the Commis-
sion's findings with respect to the standard are supported by substan-
tial evidence. This is clearly an appropriate and necessary judicial 
consideration, and one that finds support in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.176 
Assuming there is substantial evidence to support the findings 
with respect to the standards relied upon, the next logical question is 
whether all. of the relevant factors and standards were utilized by the 
Commission in reaching its decision. This problem particularly trou-
bled Judge Celebrezze in Daniels: 
[W]e are seriously perturbed about the trial judge's avowal that since 
1938 or 1939, bis court has ... sentenced ,to five years in the peni-
tentiary every young man who has refused to obey an order of a draft 
board. That statement . . . suggests a general practice . • . of im-
posing a sentence without particular reference to the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the crime or of the background of the 
criminal defendant.177 
Judge Celebrezze was concerned with the consistent failure of the 
trial court to utilize all of the relevant factors. At least one danger in 
such a failure is that it "contradicts the judicially approved policy in 
favor of 'individualizing sentences.' "178 Because the same danger is 
present, the same general principle ought to apply to sanctioning 
practice. Moreover, in the context of sanctioning practice, the failure 
to consider all of the relevant factors may also result in a related 
deficiency. If, rather than a consistent failure to consider all of the 
relevant factors in all cases, there is an inconsistent failure to consider 
all of the relevant factors in some cases, there is a danger that similar 
cases will not be treated similarly. In fact, as described earlier,179 
this problem seems to arise in some SEC cases. 
A judicial requirement that all of the relevant factors and stan-
dards be considered by the agency would minimize the problems 
raised by the ''comparable case" argument-the argument that of-
fenders in similar cases, or other offenders in the same case, have 
been treated less severely.180 The current response of the Commission 
176. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970). Both Professor Davis and Judge 
Friendly appear to agree. See K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 982 (Supp. 1970); 
Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 
1966). See also Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 
(1973); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 599 (2d Cir. 1969). 
177. United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis 
added). 
178. 446 F.2d at 971, quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949). 
179. See text at notes 21-29 supra. 
180. See, e.g., Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967); Martin A. 
Fleishman, 43 S.E.C. 185 (1966). 
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and the courts to this argument has usually taken one of two forms: 
that the necessary remedial action "cannot be precisely determined by 
comparison with action taken in other cases"181 or that there is no 
requirement that comparable cases be treated alike.182 
The first response is obviously true if it means only that sanction-
ing practice can never be mathematically precise. What it does not 
explain, however, is why courts should not attempt to make sanction-
ing practice as precise as is practicable within the framework of 
individualized justice. Surely, if courts require agencies to account 
for all of the relevant factors in reaching a sanctioning decision, it will 
be easier to isolate like cases and thus easier to treat such cases 
similarly. That mathematical precision will never be reached is 
hardly an argument for not doing all that can be done. Courts, of 
course, often respond to a defendant's allegation that offenders in 
comparable cases were treated more leniently by stating that the 
difference "is irrelevant because the sanctions imposed upon the 
[defendant] were well within the Commission's discretion."188 Again 
however, the fact that "[t]he Commission must have a very large 
measure of discretion in determining what sanctions to impose"18' 
should not insulate completely the Commission's decisions. The 
courts should at least make sure that the Commission's discretion has 
been exercised reasonably and with an even hand.181, By requiring 
the agencies to consider all of the relevant factors before imposing a 
sanction, the courts not only would be fulfilling their obligation to 
maintain the integrity of the legal process, but would also be aiding 
the agencies in fulfilling their own obligations to that process. 
The second response to the comparable case argument-that 
there is no requirement that comparable cases be treated alike-
requires two answers. First, the statement taken literally runs counter 
to the concept of a system of law applicable to all equally. Judicial 
approval of the policy of individualized sanctions186 is not inconsist-
ent with the concept of equality of ~eatment. The policy of indivi-
181. Martin A Fleishman, 43 S.E.C. 185 (1966). 
182. See, e.g., Shawmut Assn. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945). The 
Supreme Court has noted that "[m]ere unevenness in the application of the sanction 
does not render its application in a particular case 'unwarranted in law.'" Butz v. 
Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 188 (1973). Arguably, the Court has 
left room for judicial intervention when the ''unevenness" is more than "mere." See 
Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1217-18 n.8 (1975). But see 512 F.2d at 
1224-25 n.15 (Russell, J., dissenting). 
183. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967). 
184. Tager v. SEC;344 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1965). 
185. See Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary Action., 23 J. LEGAL •Eouc. 
63, 64 (1971). 
186. See United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 1971). 
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dualized sanctions means that the attempt to determine a proper 
sanction must go beyond mere identification of the statutory offense 
and must include all of the relevant information about the offense and 
the offender.187 . When the individualizing process is complete, how-
ever, there will still be groups of like cases. To be sure, the process is 
not mathematically precise, but, again, like cases should be treated 
alike to the extent practically possible. 
Second, to say that comparable cases need not be treated alike 
raises a question about the extent to which an agency ought to follow 
its established policies and precedents. This, of course, is the third 
component of the test that a court might use to evaluate the propriety 
of the agency's utilization of sanctioning standards: has the agency 
inexplicably departed from its established policy or practice? Even if 
all of the relevant factors are accounted for, the agency may seek to 
impose a different sanction than it has imposed in similar cases fn the 
past. Clearly, agencies are intended to have flexibility in carrying out 
their functions;188 furthermore, while standards are developed by 
experience, "[t]he administrator is expected to treat experience not as 
a jailer but as a teacher.ms9 Nonetheless, there is an important 
difference between modifying policy to meet changing regulatory 
needs, and inexplicable departures from established policy.190 If the 
Commission determines that it is necessary to depart from its custom-
ary practice in sanctioning a particular type of offense, it ought to 
explain the factors that necessitated the change. Without such expla-
nation, neither the court nor the defendant can determine whether 
discretion was exercised by "rules of reason"191 or by whim and 
caprice. 
The final judicial inquiry regarding the propriety of an agency's 
1-87. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); United States v. 
Daniels, 446 F.2d 967,971 (6th Cir. 1971). 
188. See Shawmut Assn. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945). 
189. Shawmut Assn. v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945). 
190. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 
(2d Cir. 1966); K. DAVIS, supra note 62, § 28.16, at 981-82 (Supp. 1970). 
The majority in Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186 (1973), 
stated: "We search in vain for that requirement [of uniformity] in the statute." One 
does not find the requirement in the statute, however, but rather in the " 'principles 
and conceptions of the "common law," and the ultimate guarantees associated with 
the Constitution.'" 411 U.S. 182, 191 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting L. JAFFE, 
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (1965). It is true, as a general-
ization, that "a sanction • . • is thus not rendered invalid in a particular case because 
it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other cases," 411 U.S. at 187, but the 
thesis here is that a different result must follow when there is gross unexplained 
disparity in sanctions in like cases. Moreover, in Butz, the majority seems implicitly 
to recognize the importance of explaining prior agency sanctioning practice. See 411 
U.S. at 186 n.4. 
191. Friendly, supra note 185, at 64. 
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utilization of sanctioning standards is whether the reasons given in 
support of the sanction's imposition are internally consistent. This 
was the precise nature of the challenge entertained by the Second 
Circuit in Wong Wing Hang.192 Wong, a Chinese citizen, had 
entered the United States under a false claim. Subsequent to his 
entry, Wong had, among other things,193 given false information to 
officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) about 
himself, his wife, and other Chinese immigrants. Wong did not 
dispute his deportability under the provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act,194 but he did apply for a (discretionary) suspension 
of deportation. Wongs eligibility to apply for the Attorney General's 
favorable exercise of discretion was conditioned on Wong's being "a 
person of good moral character."195 Although the Special Inquiry 
Officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals "found that Wong's 
misconduct . . . was insufficient to condemn him as lacking 'good 
moral character,' "196 his application was denied because of his pre-
varications. On appeal, "Wong contend[ed] that the determination 
... [was] internally inconsistent-he was found to have possessed 
'good moral character' . . . yet was faulted for prevarication. 
"197 
Judge Friendly, however, held that the result was not necessarily 
"a self-contradiction" since the finding of good moral character 
merely made Wong eligible to apply for suspension of deportation 
and did not require the discretionary grant of suspension. Further-
more, Judge Friendly found that, independent of the "mere" eligi-
bility requirements, false statements made to the INS might be an 
appropriate standard to guide the ultimate exercise of discretion to 
suspend deportation.198 
Regardless of one's opinion of the result, the importance of 
Wong Wing Hang is in Judge Friendly's recognition that an exercise 
of discretion may be judicially reviewed to determine whether the 
agency's reasons for its actions are internally consistent. This seems 
appropriate, for clearly the agency should do more than demonstrate 
192. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715 
(1966). 
193. He had also been convicted as a co-conspirator in the perpetration of 
passport frauds. 360 F.2d at 716. 
194. Immigration & Nationality Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. ·§ 12Sl(a)(2) 
(1970). 
195. Immigration & Nationality Act § 244(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) 
(1970). 
196. 360 F.2d at 717. 
197. 360 F.2d at 719. 
198. 360 F.2d at 719. 
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that it has made findings and has considered all of the appropriate 
standards-it must also show that its decision was rational. 
Finally, it should •be noted that the proposed :framework ,to guide 
judicial inquiry into alleged abuses of discretion does not purport to 
solve all cases mechanically; rather, it is intended to direct the inquiry 
and to require courts to do more than merely determine whether the 
sanctions chosen were within the permissible statutory range.199 
C. Equal Protection Challenges to Sanctioning Discretion 
The most serious problem disclosed by the case study was the 
apparent disparity between sanctions imposed on NYSE members 
and those imposed on all other offenders. Because of the potential 
for- a constitutional challenge based upon this disparity in SEC sanc-
tions, the equal protection implications of SEC practice are discussed 
here separately. 200 
In the context of the SEC's sanctioning practice, an equal protec-
tion challenge would not be directed at a discriminatory classification 
contained in a formal rule, nor at the factors that the Commission has 
indicated it will use in guiding its discretion; rather, the challenge 
would be directed at the discriminatory patterns of SEC sanctioning 
practice. These patterns of actual practice are, in effect, the "law." 
This approach is not new; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,201 decided nearly one 
hundred years ago, held that, "-[t]hough the law itself be fair on its 
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered 
by public authority with . . . an unequal hand, so as to practically 
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar 
circumstances . . . the denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the Constitution."202 However, despite the apparent 
199. The framework for review is not inconsistent with the rule for review, 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, that a sanction may not be overturned unless it is 
" 'unwarranted in law or . • • without justification in fact • . • .• " Butz v. Glover 
Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973). Review of the factual 
justification finds its counterpart in the substantial evidence inquiry suggested above. 
The other elements of the framework for review suggested above are elaborations on 
how to determine whether the sanction has warrant in the law, an inquiry that must 
go beyond a conclusion that the sanction is within the statutory range, or an 
unanalyzed conclusion that differences in sanction severity do not warrant reversal. 
200. In the context of an equal protection challenge to a federal agency, it is 
important to note that "[w]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection 
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due 
process.'" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973) (Brennan, J.), 
quoting Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). Recently, Justice Brennan 
stated: "This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has 
always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'' Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). 
201. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
202. 118 U.S. at 373-74. 
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encouragement that Yick Wo may offer, an equal protection chal-
lenge is not without difficulties. 
For one thing, although the Warren Court's two-tiered test for 
equal protection inquiries has been much criticized, 208 the Court has 
not abandoned the du~ standard in spite of recent opportunities to do 
so. For example, in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 204 .the Court reiterated its adherence to ,the two-tiered 
standard: "We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financ-
ing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect 
class or infringes upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. 
. . . If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine 
whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose . . . ."205 Thus, if the SEC's sanctioning practice is to be 
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, it must be shown that either a 
suspect class or fundamental right is involved; if a suspect class or 
fundamental right is not present, then the less rigorous "mere ration-
ality" standard will be applied. The Court is not likely, however, to 
expand the list of classes now recognized as suspect to include non-
NYSE broker-dealers;206 nor is employment likely to be recognized as 
"a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Consti-
tution."207 
It is true that employment offered, controlled, or licensed by the 
government has received increased constitutional protection in the 
form of due process notice and hearing requirements. 208 Yet, the 
203. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Wilkinson, 
The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitu-
tional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
204. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
205. 411 U.S. at 17. 
206. The categories now recognized as suspect include: race, Loving v. Virginia, 
382 U.S. 1 (1967); national origin, Graham v. Richardson, 402 U.S. 365 (1971); and 
alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), It appears that not even 
classifications based upon gender or wealth are automatically suspect. Although 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973 ), classified sex as suspect, only four 
justices specifically agreed to that basis for the decision (one of whom, Justice 
Douglas, bas since resigned from the Court), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636 (1975), failed to invoke the suspect class criterion. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71 (1971) (sex); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (wealth). 
207. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
208. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Willner v. Committee 
on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 
(1957); Schlochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Hornsby v. 
Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). 
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expanded notions of liberty209 and property210 that form the basis for 
procedural due process protection do not necessarily require the 
Court to designate employment a fundamental right for . equal 
protection pur.poses.211 As the Rodriguez Court said: 
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional 
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is 
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance 
of education . • . • Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether 
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 212 
Arguably, in light of the intimate tie between employment and the 
ultimate enjoyment of both liberty and property,213 the Court ought 
to scrutinize strictly the rational basis of any classification that in-
fringes upon employment; indeed, liberty and property become empty 
vessels for the average citizen if employment is not carefully protected 
from arbitrary or unequal governmental interference or termina-
tion. 214 It is not likely, however, that the Court will find in the text 
of the Constitution a basis for declaring employment to be a funda-
209. " 'Without doubt, [liberty] clenotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual . • • to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, • • • and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized • • . as essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.'" Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923). · . 
210. "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person . . . [must] have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (i972). The Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 
(1970), cited with approval the following passage from Reich, Individual Rights and 
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 14 YALE LJ. 1245, 1255 (1964): 
"Society today is built around entitlement. The a¥tomobile dealer has his franchise, 
the doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, 
contract, and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options .•.. " 
211. In Rodriguez, for example; education was not thought to have the status of a 
fundamental right in spite of its obvious importance and in spite of the fact that 
education, like employment, receives due process bearing protections. See Dixon v. 
State Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
212. 411 U.S. at 33-34. 
213. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 212-16 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). 
214. Justice Marshall, for instance, bas advocated a "sliding scale test" for equal 
protection inquiries that would require the Court "in every case • • • to determine the 
extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not 
mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitutional 
guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional 
interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when 
the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted accordingly." San 
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (dissent-
ing). Under such a formula, might not liberty be the "specific constitutional 
guarantee" and employment the "nonconstitutional interest"? Even the majority in 
Roth recognized liberty as encompassing "the right of the individual • . • to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life •••• " Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564,572 (1972). 
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mental right. Thus, under the terms of the two-tiered test that 
governs equal protection analysis, the propriety of the de facto classi-
fication of SEC broker-dealers would be evaluated by the less de-
manding "mere rationality" standard. 
Although it has been said that when applying the mere rationality 
standard a classification will be upheld if its use is justifiable under 
any conceivable set of facts,215 the test so stated is misleading. First, 
it detracts from the proper focus of the test, which is that a classifica-
tion must bear a rational relationship to a permissible state objec-
tive, 216 or, as the Court has recently held, a "legitimate, articulated 
state purpose."217 Second, although adhering to the mere rationality 
rubric, recent Supreme Court decisions have struck down classifica-
tions after engaging in an evaluative process substantially more rigor-
ous than a search for "any conceivable" set of facts that would justify 
the use of the classification. 218 This arguably more demanding 
search for a rational basis is particularly important where, as here, 
fundamental societal interests are at stake. 
Is there a rational relationship between the classification of NYSE 
broker-dealers and some articulated purpose of the securities acts that 
would justify imposing less severe sanctions on NYSE members as 
compared with all others? It might be argued, for example, that 
Congress may have recognized that 'NYSE members are, on the 
whole, better operated and less likely to violate the law than non-
NYSB broker-dealers. Assuming, arguendo, the validity of that 
proposition, "it tends to miss the point. The imposition of a sanction 
depends on a finding that a person has in fact violated the securities 
acts, regardless of how one might choose to characterize the member-
ship groups to which the offender belongs. Thus, even if most NYSE 
members have higher standards of conduct than nonmembers, that 
does not dispose of the problem of sanctioning those NYSE members 
who do violate the law. Although the fact that NYSE members are 
215. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
216. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 
217. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) 
(emphasis added). 
218. Recent decisions applying an apparently more rigorous scrutiny seem to 
involve classes that are at least arguably suspect, see, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (sex); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) 
(illegitimacy), but the Court appears to have gone beyond the traditional rationality 
scrutiny even when no "quasi-suspect" class is involved, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972) (marital status). To be sure, the Court has not always accepted the 
invitation to apply stricter scrutiny. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) 
("benign" sex-based classifications); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (sex 
distinctions in Navy promotions). 
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better regulated than other broker-dealers219 may be a valid consider-
ation in allocating limited SEC enforcement resources (and thus the 
Commission may decide to leave most regulation of NYSE members 
to the Exchange, or it may find it necessary to proceed against NYSE 
members less frequently), it does not provide a basis for less severe 
sanctions when the SEC finds that a NYSE member has violated the 
law. In addition, it should be remembered that when the Commis-
sion does institute administrative proceedings against Exchange mem-
bers, the violations alleged are--like those of other respondents-
usually egregious fraud. 220 · 
The fact that the NYSE may impose sanctions upon its mem-
bers221 in addition to any sanctions imposed by the SEC (either 
before or after the SEC acts) also fails to provide a reasonable basis 
to support less severe sanctions for NYSE respondents. For one 
thing, the case study found that in nearly ninety-six per cent of the 
SEC cases (ninety-five of ninety-nine) involving NYSE respondents, 
there had been no prior NYSE action. In the four cases in which 
proceedings by the NYSE preceded action by the Commission, the 
sanctions imposed by the SEC and the NYSE were comparable. 222 
Furthermore, even if the NYSE should decide to institute proceedings 
subsequent to an SEC proceeding, the NYSE Constitution states that 
the NYSE's sanction may not be greater than that imposed by the 
Commission, and, in the case of suspension, the suspension imposed 
by the NYSE shall not "commence before or expire after the suspen-
sion imposed by [the SEC]."223 Consequently, the fact that the 
NYSE may impose its own sanctions does not appear to provide a 
rational basis for the SEC's current sanctioning practice. 224 
219. There are, however, those who do not believe NYSE firms are well regulated. 
See, e.g., H. BARUCH, WALL STREr:r: SECURITY RlsK (1971). 
220. See SEC Case Study, supra note 6, at 516 (Table MM). 
221. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(b)(6), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b)(6) 
(Supp. Aug. 1975). 
222. Although the Commission has the authority to suspend or expel a member 
from the NYSE, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78s(h) (2) (Supp. Aug. 1975), the Commission took such action in only two cases 
examined in the case study. 
223. New York Stock Exchange Constitution, art. XIV, § 16 (1973). If the 
Exchange does not fulfill its statutory duty to discipline its members, whether before 
or after SEC action, the Commission has the statutory power to discipline the 
Exchange itself (by suspending or withdrawing its registration). Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § 19(h)(1), .15~U.S.C.A. § 78s(hl(l) (Supp. Aug. 1975). The 
Commission has never used this power against the NYSE. The 1975 amendments to 
the Exchange Act added a provision permitting the Commission "to censure or 
impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and operations or• an exchange. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(h)(1) (Supp. Aug. 
1975). This may prove to be a more flexible, and therefore more realistic, sanction. 
224. It is true, of course, that in a particular case in which the Exchange has 
already taken disciplinary action against a member, the Commission might decide that 
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Another possible explanation for the Commission's practice of de 
facto classification may be the importance of the Exchange to the 
securities market and to the economy generally. The Exchange is, of 
course, the most important center for trading in securities. In 1972, 
for instance, the NYSE's trading volume was $168.9 billion-about 
78 per cent of all exchange trading. 225 Thus, it might be argued that 
to expel (or even to suspend for long periods) member firms would 
interfere with this important economic institution. However, it ap-
pears equally plausible to suggest that, because of the enormous 
importance of the NYSE, its members ought to be vigorously regu-
lated and disciplined when violations are found to have occurred. 220 
If the purposes of the securities acts are to protect investors and to in-
spire confidence in fair markets for securities, then the most impor-
tant members of the industry should not be the least likely to be 
sanctioned for misconduct. 
A related argument in favor of treating NYSE members less 
severely is that NYSE members are more likely to affect the accounts 
of a large number of investors, in which case revocation could have a 
disruptive effect upon millions of customers. Again, however, the 
better approach would seem to be vigorous enforcement of the securi-
ties laws in the case of NYSE members precisely because the protec-
tion of so many investors is at stake. To be sure, one ought not to 
take lightly a decision to revoke the registration of a firm with branch 
offices throughout the country; indeed, the violation may have been 
limited to one branch or department. A decision to revoke the 
registration of a firm, however, is not the Commission's only alterna-
tive. If some, but not all, of the firm's personnel were involved, the 
individuals responsible for the violation may be the only ones ex-
pelled-a solution that achieves the purpose of the securities acts 
without necessarily affecting the registration of the firm. In fact, 
however, few individuals associated with NYSE firms are barred for 
offenses that result in bar when committed by their non-NYSE coun-
terparts. 221 
its own disciplinary proceeding is unnecessary. That determination, however, should 
go to the question whether to proceed, not what sanction to impose after deciding to 
proceed. 
225. 39 SEC .ANNuAL REPORT 154 (1973). 
226. See Reynolds & Co., 39 S.E.C. 902, 916 (1960) ("[l]n large organizations it 
is especially imperative that the system of internal control be adequate and effective 
and that those in authority exercise the utmost vigilance whenever even a remote 
indicatic;>n of irregularity reaches their attention"). 
227. Limited expulsion has been imposed in both fraud and nonfraud cases. Also, 
rather than -suspend the operations of an entire firm office, the SEC has imposed 
sanctions on single departments or branch offices. These limited sanctions were 
adopted in twenty-seven NYSE cases, but only seven non-NYSE cases. The high 
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The upshot of this inquiry is that it is at least arguable that the 
Commission's de facto classification of NYSE broker-dealers fails to 
bear a rational relationship to any of the legitimate articulated pur-
poses of the securities acts; therefore, even under the mere rationality 
test, this aspect of the Commission's practice would seem to violate 
the equal protection clause. 
The theoretical difficulties of making an equal protection based 
challenge to the Commission's practice are, however, probably not the 
most substantial roadblocks; the real problem is the present judicial 
attitude toward review of sanctions (or sentences). For example, in 
McGautha v. California, 228 the Supreme Court refused to uphold a 
constitutional challenge to standardless jury sentencing in spite of the 
"undeniable surface appeal of the proposition."229 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Harlan stated: 
To identify before the fact those characteristics . . . which call for 
the death penalty, and to express [them] in language which can be 
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to 
be tasks which are beyond present human ability . . . . 
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of 
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing 
to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life 
or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitu-
tion. 2so 
Formulating reasonable standards to guide the exercise of sanc-
tioning discretion is not an easy task, but it certainly is not a task 
beyond present human ability. AB Justice Brennan suggested in his 
dissent in McGautha, the matter is capable of solution; the failure to 
make an attempt to find "imaginative procedures" designed ",to as~ 
sure evenhanded treatment"231 is to tolerate "Government by whim 
... , the very antithesis of due process."232 Thus, as Justice Bren-
nan pointed out, by refusing to provide a meaningful form of judicial 
review over the sanctioning process, the Court in Mc,Gautha sustained 
"against a due process challenge such an unguided, unbridled, unre-
viewable exercise of naked power" as never before. 233 
frequency for NYSE firms is explained in part by the fact that NYSE firms are more 
likely to have branch offices. They would not, however, necessarily be more likely to 
have departments. 
228. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
229. 402 U.S. at 196. 
230. 402 U.S. at 204, 207. 
231. 402 U.S. at 249. 
232. 402 U.S. at 250. 
233. 402 U.S. at 252. 
758 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:709 
V. CONCLUSION 
Devices for providing meaningful control over administrative 
sanctioning discretion are presently available, and administrative or 
legislative promulgation of sanctioning standards is both necessary 
and feasible. With or without standards embodied in formal regula-
tions, however, the courts should recognize the necessity of exercising 
their authority to subject sanctioning practice to review. 
In light of the existing framework to guide review of the exercise 
of administrative discretion, the reluctance of the courts to subject 
sanctioning discretion to meaningful review is curious. 284 The ne-
cessity for review seems obvious, and the basis for judicial review of 
other agency action (and the exercise of discretion in general) is an 
accepted part of administrative law. Those same principles of judi-
cial review can be applied to the sanctioning process without sacrific-
ing flexibility. In short, although discretion is necessary in the 
sanctioning process, such discretion must be exercised reasonably and 
lawfully, not arbitrarily. Thus, an agency's decision to choose an 
appropriate sanction ought to be guided by proper standards and 
supported by adequate findings and reasons. 
It is sometimes suggested that requiring agencies to supply rea-
sons for their discretionary decisions and subjecting those decisions to 
review would impose unnecessary costs upon the agency. When 
essential questions are raised that challenge the inherent fairness of 
our system of adjudication, however, arguments and equations about 
costs and benefits must themselves be weighted against the costs to a 
just legal system. In the case of the SEC, a requirement of standards 
~d reasons would not place a substantial new burden upon the 
agency; the agency not only already has rule-making authority and 
rule-making mechanisms, but already formulates specific reasoned 
opinions that purport to justify its sanctions in light of the statutorily 
imposed public interest standard. If judicial scrutiny of the agency's 
standards and reasons imposes a cost upon the agency, that expense is 
balanced by the potential cost to offenders who may have been 
sanctioned arbitrarily. 
234. See Butz v. Glover Livestock Commn. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 189-91 (1973) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart criticized the majority for ignoring 
"the valid principle of law • . .-the principle that like cases are to be treated alike," 
411 U.S. at 190, and noted further that the Court's refusal, in effect, to permit 
meaningful review of sanctions represented "an odd result at a time when serious 
concern is being expressed about the fairness of agency justice," 411 U.S. at 191, 
